Three Essays in Immigrant Post-Migration Human Capital Investment and Heterogeneity by Zhou, Nan
THREE ESSAYS IN IMMIGRANT POST-MIGRATION HUMAN






Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Concordia University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada
c© Nan Zhou May 2014
CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
This is to certify that the thesis prepared
By: Nan Zhou
Entitled: Three Essays in Immigrant Post-Migration Human Capital Investment
and Heterogeneity
and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Economics)
compiles with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards
with respect to originality and quality.














Dr. E. Diamantoudi, Graduate Program Director
Dr. Joanne Locke, Dean of Faculty of Arts and Science
ii
ABSTRACT




The following thesis consists of three essays. Each one is a study of the issues
of the selection effect of Canadian immigration policy, post-migration human capital
investment, and their associated effects on immigrants’ labour market performance
and economic assimilation. All three papers are explored under the consideration
of unobserved heterogeneity. The data are taken from the Longitudinal Survey of
Immigrants to Canada (LSIC).
The first essay examines the determinants of post-migration human capital in-
vestment, and the effects of this investment on immigrant realized utility and wage
income from Canadian labour market. Post-migration human capital investment
includes Canadian formal education and a general definition of training. This es-
say concludes that pre-migration human capital complements post-migration human
capital investment. Furthermore, the investment in post-migration human capital
lubricates immigrants’ transfer from unemployment to employment.
The second study explores the effects of the ’stock’ of human capital that immi-
grants possess, on their occupational choices in the Canadian labour market. The
stock of human capital includes both pre-migration human capital, and the part
formed through investing in the destination country. This study confirms that immi-
grants with more stock of pre-migration human capital are inclined to be employed
in white-collar occupations, compared to blue-collar occupations or unemployed and
searching for jobs. The findings also indicate that once immigrants complete their
iii
first training, they locate at a higher utility level after obtaining employment, either
white-, blue-collar occupations or being self-employed.
The third essay employs the existence of asymmetric information and its effect
on the Canadian labour market. This study explores three plausible signals that
are prevalent on the Canadian labour market; it also studys the influence of these
signals on the immigrant economic assimilation in the first years after landing. The
signals comprise the relative level of formal education, foreign credential recognition
and pre-arranged job before migration. Empirical results from this essay confirm
that Canadian immigrants who landed around the period the LSIC was held are
heterogeneous. Further more, this heterogeneity leads to a different assimilation path
within the first four years after landing.
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The entry of immigrants into the destination country and their assimilation there-
after, attract a lot of attention from labour economists and policy makers. Since the
first generation research that was published in the 1970s, the determinants that affect
whether an immigrant is able to assimilate successfully, and the speed he or she can
integrate into the destination country labour market, is still in discussion. Examples
include the relationship between pre-migration human capital and post-migration hu-
man capital, and the effects of post-migration human capital investment on immigrant
assimilation. The work presented here approaches the following research questions
from a variety of dimensions with different methodologies: first, what is the relation-
ship between immigrants’ pre-migration human capital and post-migration human
capital investment; second, what are the effects of immigrants’ stock of human cap-
ital on their economic assimilation; and third, what is the influence of immigrants’
unobserved heterogeneity on their economic integration?
To address the proposed research questions, this thesis consists of three essays.
The three essays that comprise the thesis complement and interact each other in a
number of ways. As a whole, this thesis is a series of investigations that explores
the dynamics of immigrant post-migration human capital investment, and its associ-
ated effects on immigrant labour market outcomes. This includes immigrant labour
market states, occupational choices and income from both wage employment and
self-employment. Under the consideration of unobserved heterogeneity, the first paper
concentrates on immigrant training decisions and their effects on the Canadian labour
market. The second paper exploits the determinants, including both pre-migration
human capital and the human capital formed through post-migration investment in
Canada, that affect immigrant occupational states. Lastly, the third paper explores
the effect of this unobserved heterogeneity onto immigrant economic assimilation.
The data used in all the three essays are taken from the Longitudinal Survey of
Immigrants to Canada (LSIC). LSIC has been jointly administered by Citizenship
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and Immigration Canada (CIC) and Statistics Canada1. The survey is designed to
provide information on how newly landed immigrants establish their economic, social
and cultural ties to Canadian society. LSIC, therefore, concentrates on immigrants
that have landed from outside of Canada within a six month range, which spans the
time from the date of landing to the first interview. The first wave data have been
collected in the period between April 2001 and May 2002. Immigrants that were
interviewed in the first wave have been followed and interviewed twice, at the end of
second and fourth year of landing.
The first essay focuses on the determinants of immigrant post-migration human
capital investment, and the effects of this investment on immigrant employment status
and labour market income. This has been fulfilled by using a discrete choice sequen-
tial decision model. This model combines immigrant labour market states with their
labour market income. This framework allows this research to include unobserved
heterogeneity into empirical analysis. Training decisions and accumulated stocks of
human capital are therefore treated as potentially endogenous. This model assumes
immigrants maximize their life time utility with a time additive utility function. Im-
migrants choose among four mutually exclusive and exhaustive labour market states
in each period: unemployed, training and unemployed, training and employed, and
employed. The estimation results confirm the importance of pre-migration human
capital on immigrant post-migration human capital investment, and also the contri-
bution of this investment to immigrant employment.
The second study explores the effects of immigrants’ stock of human capital, in-
cluding the human capital formed through post-migration investment (discussed in
the first essay) on their labour market outcomes. These labour market outcomes
includes both immigrants’ occupational states, and their incomes from wage employ-
ment or self-employment. This essay uses the same methodology that is adopted in
1The analysis and empirical results of the data represent the author’s opinion toward immigration
and immigrant issues.
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the first study. It assumes that immigrants maximize their lifetime utility through
choosing four mutually exclusive and exhaustive occupational states in each period.
The occupational states are: unemployed and searching, employed in white-collar
occupations, employed in blue-collar occupations, and lastly, self-employment. The
empirical results reveal that, besides the contribution of pre-migration human cap-
ital, the post-migration human capital investment helps immigrants transfer from
unemployment into one of the employment states. Results indicate that the largest
marginal effect of post-migration human capital investment is on blue-collar occu-
pations. This essay also confirms that unobserved heterogeneity affects immigrants’
choice to pursue relevant labour market employment or to be self-employed.
The third essay employs the unobserved heterogeneity and its effect on the Cana-
dian labour market by using asymmetric information theory. By proposing three
plausible signals and testing their predictions on labour market outcomes, this re-
search further confirms the existence of heterogeneity, or productive ability, among
immigrants, which has been estimated in the first and the second essay. This essay
has also tested immigrants’ different assimilation paths in the Canadian labour mar-
ket, caused by this unobserved heterogeneity. Empirical results reveal that, compared
to immigrants with low ability, immigrants with high ability have longer employment
duration, receive relatively higher income from the Canadian labour market, and
have faster wage growth within the first four years after landing. This essay therefore
provides a novel look at the selection results of Canadian immigration policy and
the process of immigrant assimilation. Policy implications for the current criteria
governing the selection of immigrants are also discussed.
This dissertation consists of three essays that share a similar structure. Each
essay starts with an abstract, continues with an introduction of the research questions
addressed in the essay and a review of relevant literature, followed by the sections









This paper utilizes data from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada
to analyze transitions into the Canadian labour market for newly arrived immigrants.
The discrete choice sequential decision model has been selected for the analysis. This
paper focuses on the effectiveness of training both in terms of entering and staying
in the labour market, and in terms of wage increments. In particular, this paper
analyzes the determinants of post-migration human capital investment, and the effect
of such investment on immigrants’ realized utility and wage income in the Canadian
labour market. A discussion about possible policy implications from our results is
also provided
Key words: training, sequential decision model, endogeneity, post-migration hu-
man capital investment, assimilation of immigrants.
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2.1 Introduction
Canada has a long tradition of receiving immigrants. Evidence shows that immi-
gration has accounted for more than half of the country’s population increase since
the 1930s (Bloom and Gunderson, 1991). Prior to 1967, immigrants generally origi-
nated from Britain and other commonwealth countries, such as Western Europe and
the U.S. At this time, language, cultural background, and the quality of education
were often similar between immigrants and the Canadian-born. Therefore, training
immigrants was not a national issue that required public attention.
The rise of the importance of equal rights in the 1960s brought many changes to
the Canadian immigration policy. In 1967, a new equal right system was adopted
that diminished the selection of immigrants from particular source countries. The
new policy allowed for immigrants to come from various countries, instead of a small
list of countries chosen by Canadian government. This policy emphasized the role of
immigrants’ adaptive ability as well as the demand of the Canadian labour market.
As a consequence of this immigration policy, substantial changes occurred in the com-
position of the immigration cohorts that arrived in Canada after 1970. In particular,
there was a strong increase in the proportion of immigrants that migrated to Canada
from developing countries. This trend was accompanied by a noticeable decrease in
the migration of individuals from the traditional source countries. Because of the dif-
ferences in language, culture, labour market requirements, and the possible disparity
of education quality, the change in the composition of the immigrant population has
increased the need to provide training for immigrants.
The positive link between immigration, economic development, and prosperity of
a destination country has been widely acknowledged. There are numerous studies
that have explored how the characteristics of immigrants influence the decision on
whether or not to invest in the accumulation of human capital after landing. Data
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limitations, however, have limited previous research being largely concentrated on
formal education with reduced form models. However, the relationship formed by a
reduced form model is not stable because of frequent policy initiatives and interven-
tions (Acemoglu, 2010). This is particularly evident for immigration policies (Boyd
and Vickers, 2000; Green and Green 1999). Therefore, it is hard to apply these find-
ings to information concerning newly arrived immigrants, and draw a dynamic picture
for the early integration process.
This paper adds to the current knowledge concerning immigrant assimilation and
integration by utilizing the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC), and
analyzes labour market characteristics of newly arrived immigrants. It also models
the effectiveness of training schemes1 to integrate newly arrived immigrants into the
Canadian labour market. Training effectiveness is, therefore, linked not only to the
speed of immigrant’s wage adjustment but also to the likelihood that immigrants find
relevant and available employment in the Canadian labour market. Accordingly, this
paper seeks to address the following questions:
1. What are the determinants of post-migration human capital investment during
the first years landed in the destination country?
2. What are the effects of post-migration human capital investment on both the
wage level and finding available employment?
3. What are the policy implications for the current criteria in the selection of
immigrants?
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides a brief review of the existing
1The definition of training in this paper includes formal education, required for foreign credential
recognition, and for career advancement and development. However, because of data limitations, it
excludes language training.
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literature; Section 2.3 presents the model used for this paper; Section 2.4 describes the
survey data, LSIC, utilized in this paper and the associated features of the sample;
Section 2.5 presents the empirical results estimated from the model described in
Section three; and lastly, Section 2.6 provides a summary of the conclusions and
policy implications.
2.2 Literature Review
Research on the economics of immigration has generally concentrated on two
areas: the entry effect and the catch-up effect. The entry effect is defined as the wage
difference between an immigrant and a native-born with comparable characteristics
at the time that the immigrant enters the destination country (Hum and Simpson,
2003). The catch-up effect, or the assimilation effect, reflects the rate at which an
immigrant moves up the economic ladder. The result is that the immigrant’s social
status converges with the average performance of their native-born counterparts (Li,
2000). Generally, findings suggest that the relative efficiency of the ’stock’ of human
capital possessed by the immigrant, either before or after migration, is important for
these two effects.
Human capital is generally measured in terms of a person’s education, either
duration or credential level, and work experience. The definition, however, creates
some ambiguities. For example, Borjas (1985) indicates that there is a tendency for
immigrant workers to receive lower wages than their native-born counterparts. Borjas
attributes this disparity to an immigrant’s lower level of pre-migration human capital.
Friedberg (2000), however, argues that the lower immigrant wage rate is due to the
inability of immigrants to integrate fully into the local labour market. Friedberg
further concludes that the lower immigrant wage is a result of low transferability of
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human capital accumulated in the country of origin to the destination-country labour
market.
The quantity and quality of transferable human capital is hard to measure directly.
It is therefore common in empirical research to divide an immigrant’s stock of human
capital into two parts: pre- and post-migration human capital. The returns to pre-
and post-migration human capital are thereby measured. Empirical findings show
that the stock of an immigrant’s post-migration human capital is highly rewarded
in the destination country; pre-migration education, however, has been undervalued
in the destination-country labour market (Friedberg 2000; Zeng and Xie 2004). The
latter result is also found to apply to foreign work experience (Miller, 1992).
The relationship between pre-migration human capital and the investment in post-
migration human capital has also been found to be ambiguous in previous studies.
On the one hand, Borjas (1985) and Khan (1997) find a negative relationship be-
tween the two, suggesting that pre-migration human capital is a substitute for post-
migration human capital. This implies that a prospective immigrant with a high level
of pre-migration human capital has less incentive to acquire additional schooling or
training in the destination country. On the other hand, Chiswick and Miller (1994)
and Friedberg (2000) find a positive relationship between the two, indicating that
pre-migration human capital becomes complementary to the investment of human
capital after landing. Under this condition, a prospective immigrant with a higher
level of pre-migration human capital will tend to invest in additional schooling or
training after migration.
Besides the level of pre-migration human capital, one of the major determinants of
post-migration human capital investment is an immigrant’s pre-migration occupation.
For example, Green (1993) and Miller (1994) conclude that white-collar occupations in
the country of origin are positively related with post-migration schooling. Unlike blue-
collar occupations (i.e. technicians and workers in the service industry), white-collar
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occupations (i.e. professionals and managers) generally require advanced educational
credentials and more training in order to meet the requirements of a specific labour
market. Therefore, the human capital of immigrants working in white-collar occupa-
tions may be less transferable from the country of origin to the destination-country
labour market.
Another major factor that determines whether or not an immigrant will invest in
the post-migration human capital is the years since immigration (Cohen and Eckstein,
2003). According to human capital theory, investment in post-migration human capi-
tal should occur as early as possible, i.e. soon after landing. However, post-migration
human capital investment also depends on age, independently from time in the des-
tination country, and consequently, the investment of human capital tends to decline
with age.
2.3 A Structural Model of Employment and Train-
ing
This paper assumes that individuals maximize expected lifetime utility by choos-
ing the optimal state over a finite horizon T . Lifetime utility is time additive. There
are K mutually exclusive and exhaustive states in each period t ∈ [0, T ]. Given this,















t = 1 for any t belonging to [0, T ]. U
k
t denotes the
contemporaneous utility of choosing option k in period t, and β is the discount factor,
0 < β ≤ 1. The information set, which includes all the relevant state variables at
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arrival and all labour market decisions since arrival, at period t is denoted Ωt.









t )|Ωt) = MaxkKV
k
t (Ωt) = V (Ωt) (2)
Following an approach similar to Cameron and Heckman (2001), this paper ap-
proximates the alternative specific value functions using a flexible functional form.
Thus, the intertemporal utility of choosing a given state k in period t is assumed to
be of the following form
V kt = X
′
tθkt + γktHCt + δktEXt + ϕk + ε
k
t (3)
for k = 1, 2, 3 and 4, where X are known characteristics of immigrants. HC denotes
accumulated human capital (training) in period t since arrival, while EX denotes
accumulated work experience in period t, again since arrival in Canada. The pa-
rameters γkt and δkt capture the structural effects of accumulated training and work
experience, respectively, on the utility of choosing option k in period t. The term ϕk
is a state specific unobserved heterogeneity term that represents individual difference
in preference on training.
In order to estimate the model, some restrictions are needed. These restrictions
will reflect the necessity to keep the number of parameters at a manageable level. It
is also necessary to hold the model to a certain level of coherency. In particular, to
reduce the number of parameters, this paper assumes that the vectors of parameters
θkt, γkt and δkt remain constant over time. Moreover, individual heterogeneity is
parameterized as follows:
ϕk = α1k + α2k ∗ µ ∀ k ∈ [1, K] (4)
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where µ is an individual specific random variable and its distribution is approximated
by a discrete distribution with two points of support (µ1 and µ2). The type proba-
bilities are estimated using logistic transformation. In order to obtain identification,
µ1 is normalized to equal zero and α21 equal one. Finally, this paper assumes that ε
k
t
represents a pure stochastic i.i.d. shock observed at the beginning of period t.
Given the above assumptions, the probability of choosing state k in period t, given
all available information at that period is
Pr(dkt = 1|X, d
k
t−1, µ) =









The model is estimated using maximum likelihood techniques. The type specific




Pr(dkt = 1|X, d
k
t−1, µm) (6)







πm ∗ L(.|µm)} (7)
2.4 Data
2.4.1 The Survey
The data that is utilized in this paper are extracted from the Longitudinal Survey
of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC), which is administered jointly by Citizenship and
Immigration Canada (CIC) and Statistics Canada. LSIC is designed to provide infor-
mation pertaining to how newly arrived immigrants establish their economic, social,
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and cultural ties to Canadian society during their first years in Canada. The survey
therefore excludes the individuals that applied and landed from within Canada. The
survey covers a four year survey period, starting from April 1, 2001 and ending on
September 30, 20052.
The survey respondents were chosen randomly among immigrants that arrived in
Canada between October 1, 2000 and September 30, 2001, 15 years of age or older at
the time of landing, and landed from outside of Canada. Those immigrants that were
selected for the survey were interviewed within a six-month period from the date of
landing to the date of first interview. Interviews were conducted three times within a
four-year period after their arrival. Data collection for the first wave began in April
2001 and ended in May 2002. Approximately 12,000 newly landed immigrants were
interviewed. It represents approximately 164,200 of the 250,000 individuals admitted
to Canada during the period. The survey population cover all Census Metropolitan
Areas (CMA) and non-remote Census Agglomerations (CA). The second and third
wave of interview were held at the end of the second and fourth year after the date
of landing. The second survey included around 9,300 immigrants, while in the third
survey the sample dropped to 7,700.
Compared to other commonly used data sources for immigration studies, such
as the Canadian Census of Population and other large-scale cross-sectional surveys,
LSIC has a comparative advantage. Besides detailed information on age, sex, mother
tongue, country of origin, visa type, knowledge of English/French etc., LSIC pro-
vides information on the immigrant’s formal education, both foreign and Canadian.
LSIC also contains detailed information on any additional training, including pur-
pose of attending training (e.g., job search, career development, and personal inter-
est, etc.), and funding resources (e.g., employer-sponsored, government-funded, or
self-financed). For these trainees, the survey records the start and end date during
2LSIC User Guide (WWW.23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb-bmdi/pub/docu-
ment/4422_d1_t1_v1-eng.pdf).
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1 51.65 7.23 3.61 37.51 3632
2 27.14 8.65 8.68 55.52 3632
3 22.83 9.73 9.76 57.68 3632
4 22.29 10.95 9.82 56.93 3632
5 20.84 11.56 11.84 55.76 3632
6 18.71 11.88 13.52 55.89 3632
7 17.05 11.53 14.72 56.70 3632
8 14.62 10.29 16.32 58.76 3632
9 12.34 10.13 15.86 61.67 3632
10 13.08 9.44 16.05 61.43 3223
11 13.53 9.25 15.22 62.00 3024
12 13.35 8.87 15.01 62.77 3024
13 13.28 8.37 13.82 64.53 3024
14 12.78 7.75 13.69 65.77 3024
15 11.25 6.95 14.14 67.66 3024
16 9.67 5.74 14.82 69.77 3024
the reference year.
LSIC also contains detailed information on the employment history of the immi-
grant after landing as well as information on pre-migration occupation3. Lastly and
perhaps most importantly, the longitudinal characteristics of LSIC make structural
analysis of immigrants post-migration human capital investment possible.
2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
The sample of this research is restricted to males that are between the ages of 18
and 45 at the time of the first interview. The age restriction is imposed in order to
avoid capturing the proportion of the population that attends compulsory schooling
(i.e., young adults), as well as the proportion of population that involves retirement
3Occupational categories in LSIC are based on the North American Industry Classification
(NAICS 1997), and the Standard Occupation Classification System (SOC 1991).
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decisions in each of the four survey years. Individuals that only participated in the
first two waves of the survey are retained in our sample, generating an unbalanced
panel. In total, there are 3,632 individuals observed for, at most, 16 quarters (See
Table 2.1).4
Table 2.1 shows the proportion of newly arrived immigrants in four mutually ex-
clusive and exhaustive labour market states: Unemployed, Training and Unemployed,
Training and Employed, and Employed. Immigrants were assigned to the states of
training if they participated in formal education, training for foreign credential recog-
nition, or for career advancement and development for at least one day in a quarter
of a year. An immigrant is assigned to the state of training and employed, if he stays
in this state longer than the state of training and unemployed in a quarter of a year.
If an immigrant is not assigned to training and worked at least one day during a
quarter, that immigrant is assigned to the state of employment. Lastly, if an immi-
grants is neither trained nor employed, he or she is assigned to the absorbing state,
unemployed.
Table 2.1 indicates that during the first quarter after landing, about seven percent
of immigrants were in the group of training and unemployed, and some four percent
were participating in training and being employed at the same time. About 38 percent
immigrants were in the state of employed in the first quarter after landing, while 52
percent were unemployed. The fraction of immigrants enrolled in training, both
employed and unemployed, increases to around 17 percent in the second quarter.
The proportion of immigrants in the state of training and unemployed drops to six
percent in the sixteenth quarter. This pattern is consistent with human capital theory,
which indicates that the investment of human capital happens in the early stage after
landing.
The percentage of employed immigrants increases steadily after landing. The
4LSIC consists of oversampled refugees thus survey weights have been used in this paper.
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percentage of immigrants that were employed is around 38 percent in the first quarter
after landing, and it reaches 70 percent at the end of survey, approximately four years
after landing. Finally, the proportion of unemployed immigrants drops from an initial
52 percent to about 10 percent in the last survey period.
Table 2.2 shows the descriptive statistics of male immigrants with and without
training. It indicates that 51.7 percent of immigrants participated in training5 at least
once after landing. Trained immigrants are marginally younger on average than those
that did not receive any training. The accumulated pre-migration formal education
for immigrants that participated in training is marginally higher: an average of 16.2
years, roughly corresponding to a college degree, for immigrants in the state of training
and employed versus an average of 15.4 years for the untrained group.
5The percentage of trainees is calculated based on the sum of trainees, with and without employ-
ment, divided by the full sample of this research (3632).
18
Table 2.2 also shows that there is a distinction in terms of the occupation in
the country of origin between those that received training and those that did not.
The fraction of employed trainees that worked in a white-collar occupation in their
country of origin is 67 percent. The corresponding proportion for the untrained group
is 57 percent. This observation, together with the average years of pre-migration
education, suggests that a positive relationship exists between the acquisition of pre-
and post-migration human capital. Furthermore, there are notable wage differences
between those with and without training. On average, immigrants earn $545 per
week for their first main job in Canada6. The corresponding average wage for the
untrained group is $568 per week. The average weekly wage of the first main job
for trainees, with (without) a job at the time of training, is $607 ($454) per week.
Interestingly, trainees also changed jobs more often than non-trainees.
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 The Effects of Human Capital and the Local Macro
Economy Environment on Immigrant Realized Utility
Table 2.3 presents the effects of human capital and the local macro-economy envi-
ronment on immigrant post-migration human capital investment decisions. The table
includes the human capital acquired from the country of origin and the corresponding
human capital that was acquired in Canada. Estimates that are associated with the
utility acquired from the state of training and unemployed are presented in column
one; estimates for the state of training and employed are in column three; and es-
timates for being employed are in column five. Given the non-linear nature of the
model, marginal effects associated with these estimates are presented in columns two,
6While many immigrants hold more than one job at a time, the LSIC asks immigrants to report
only one occupation as his or her main job for each interview.
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four, and six.
Consistent with the existing literature, foreign education has an important influ-
ence on immigrant post-migration human capital investment decisions. Compared to
being unemployed, immigrants with more foreign education receive more utility from
training, no matter whether they are employed or not. However, the effect of foreign
education on the state of employment is not significant.
The proficiency in either French or English, Canada’s official languages, has a
significant effect on the immigrant post-migration human capital investment decisions.
Immigrants that speak English or French fluently participate in training or join labour
force more so than immigrants that have a poor knowledge of both Canada’s official
languages. Compared to the state of unemployment, immigrants that speak English or
French fluently are more inclined to be in the states of training and employment. The
largest marginal effect of language efficiency (0.44) comes from the state of employed.
The occupation that an immigrant held in his country of origin right before mi-
gration has a similar effect as foreign education and language proficiency. Compared
to immigrants that never worked in their country of origin, immigrants that held a
white-collar occupation are inclined to be in the state of training and employed. Fur-
thermore, they also locate at a higher utility level, marginally significant, from being
in the state of employed. Immigrants that worked in a blue-collar occupation in their
country of origin right before migration, however, are not significantly different from
immigrants that never worked7.
The accumulation of human capital in Canada also influences immigrants’ post-
migration human capital investment. The longer an immigrant stays in the state of
training and employed, the higher utility level he or she acquires, if he or she keeps
staying in this state. The accumulated period of training and employment decreases
7For descriptive statistics not shown here, immigrants that never worked before migration are
relatively younger, with median at 24 years old, compared to immigrants that worked in blue-collar
(white-collar) occupations in the country of origin, with median at 30 (34) years old.
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Table 2.3: The Effects of Human Capital Parameters and the Local Macro



































































































an immigrant’s utility level if he or she chooses to be in the state of training and
unemployed. However, its effect on the state of training and unemployment is not
significant. The state of training and unemployed has similar effects as the state of
training and employment–it increase an immigrant’s realized utility if he or she stay
in this state. Lastly, the marginal effect of accumulated periods of employment posi-
tively affects an immigrant’s realized utility level, if that immigrant keeps his or her
job in the next period.
The accumulation of unemployed periods significantly lowers immigrants’ realized
utility level in all states other than unemployment. This is due to the fact that
accumulative unemployed periods depreciate immigrants’ human capital. Another
possible reason is that immigrants are frustrated and discouraged, the longer that
they stay unemployed.
The local macro-economic environment is also a key determinant in immigrants’
states. The marginal effect of a one percent increase of provincial unemployment
rates decreases the utility level of an employed immigrant at 0.004.
2.5.2 The Effects of Individual Characteristics, Immigrant
Classes, and the Previous Period Training State on Im-
migrant Realized Utility
Table 2.4 reports the effects of immigrants’ individual characteristics, and the pre-
vious period state on immigrant post-migration human capital investment decisions.
Consistent with the previous literature, older immigrants are less inclined to be in
the states of training, either employed or unemployed. The effect of age on employ-
ment, however, is not significant. Married immigrants locate at a higher utility level,
compared to immigrants that are not married, if employed.
The state occupied by an immigrant in one period has significant influence on his
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Table 2.4: The Effects of Individual Characteristics, Immigrant Classes, and





























































Family immigrants - - -
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or her utility level in the next period. An immigrant’s utility level will be significantly
increased if he or she was in the state of training and unemployed in one period and
continues training, either employed or unemployed, in the next period. The state of
employment in one period significantly increases an immigrant’s utility level if he or
she is continuing to be employed, with or without training, in the next period. An
immigrant is strictly better off if he or she was in the state of training and employed
in one period, and in a state other than unemployment in the next period.
Immigrants that are admitted under the refugee and economic class receive less
utility from being employed, compared with family reunion immigrants, and the ef-
fects are statistically significant. This result is not surprising when considering the
respondents of LSIC are immigrants that arrived and landed from outside of Canada.
Compared to family reunion immigrants, refugees and economic immigrants lack in-
formation concerning Canadian labour market. And, furthermore, refugee have a
relative lower human capital transferability. As a result, refugees and economic im-
migrants are more likely to experience a downward shift of their occupations in the
Canadian labour market, compared to the occupation they held right before mi-
grating to Canada. They therefore tend to work in an occupation different to their
intended occupation8. On the contrary, family class immigrants have connections
within Canada and could access much more labour-market information. In partic-
ular, family reunion immigrants can be considered to be not completely new to the
Canadian labour market, due to the relay of information from family members and
friends. This provides them with a significant advantage on the destination-country
labour market in the early assimilation period.
8Please see the second essay: Occupational Decisions and the Early Assimilation of Immigrants
to Canada
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2.5.3 The Effects of Country of Origin and Residential Re-
gion in Canada on Immigrant Realized Utility
Table 2.5 presents the effects of immigrant country of origin on their post-migration
human capital investment decisions. Compared to immigrants from traditional source
countries, such as the U.S., UK, and Western European countries, immigrants from
other countries or regions, such as Northern and Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and
South America, are less inclined to be in the states of employment, whether in training
or not. This reflects the difference of human capital transferability and therefore the
declined of occupational status for immigrants originally from developing countries.
Table 2.6 reports the effects of the residential region in Canada on immigrant’s
post-migration human capital investment decisions. There is no significant difference
for the state of training and unemployed among immigrants that live in Ontario (the
reference group), and immigrants that live in other Canadian provinces. There are
25
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some exceptions, such as some states in Alberta, Quebec, and the Atlantic provinces.
Immigrants that live in Quebec and Alberta are at a lower utility level if they are
employed, whether they participated in training or not. Immigrants that live in one
of the four Atlantic Provinces9 receive more utility if they are either employed or in
the state of training and employed.
2.5.4 The Determinants for Wage
Table 2.7 reports the estimates of the wage equation. The results focus on immi-
grant‘s accumulation of pre- and post-migration human capital. Foreign education
has a positive effect on immigrants’ expected wage. Holding other factors constant,
each additional year of foreign education increases an immigrant‘s expected wage
in the Canadian labour market. Proficiency in one of Canadian official languages,
9Atlantic provinces include New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, and
Prince Edward Island.
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Table 2.7: The Wage Equation
Estimates Std.Err.
Foreign education 0.043 (0.001)
Language 0.200 (0.007)







Accumulative employment 0.011 (0.001)
and accumulated Canadian work experience, significantly increases an immigrant’s
expected wage.
Accumulated periods of training, either employed or unemployed, however, de-
crease an immigrant’s expected wage. This may be indicative of the mismatch be-
tween an immigrant’s acquisition of human capital in their country of origin, and
the occupation they are currently holding in Canada. Unlike a fixed period of train-
ing provided by the Israel’s government (Cohen and Eckstein, 2003), the duration of
training and the number of training sessions a Canadian immigrant participated in
are flexible in this paper. This result, therefore, may reflect the fact that the immi-
grants who utilize training efficiently enter into the state of employment quickly10.
This may also represent the impact of the formal education that immigrants partic-
ipated after landed in Canada. Since LSIC covers the first four years after landing,
immigrants that participate in formal education in Canada are most likely to still be
at school and working in a nonprofessional occupation. Their wage therefore, cannot
adequately represent the return of human capital that is obtained through Canadian
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post-secondary education.
As expected, accumulated unemployment periods depreciate human capital and
decrease immigrant expected wage.
2.5.5 The Estimated and Actual Transition Probability
Table 2.8 presents the estimated transition matrix between states. The estimated
structural stability rates are much lower than the actual transition matrix (Table
2.9). This is due to the serial correlation of time invariant unobserved heterogeneity,
ϕ, which has been isolated and estimated from the structural model.
The estimated transition probability reveals that the first four years after land-
ing is a volatile period for immigrants. That said, employment is one of the main
transition destinations. When an immigrant is unemployed in one period, he or she
will stay unemployed with a probability equal to 0.49 in the next period. However,
by the next period, an unemployed immigrant is predicted to find employment with
a probability equal to 0.41. The structural stability for the states of training, both
employed and unemployed, are about 0.57 and 0.51, respectively. The highest struc-
tural stability is among immigrants that are employed. If an immigrant is in the state
of employment in one period, he or she will stay employed with probability equal to
0.88 in the next period.
2.5.6 Unobserved Heterogeneity
Table 2.10 presents unobserved heterogeneity and its effect on both immigrants’
states and labour market income. With an adopted two point system and with µ1
fixed at zero to represent Type I immigrants, there are six percent11 of immigrants
10The second essay of this thesis (Zhou, 2011) confirms that the first time training is effectively
transfer immigrants from being unemployed into the states of employment in the Canadian labour
market.
11Calculated based on logistic expression: exp(q)/(1+exp(q)) with q equal to -2.758.
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Unemployed 0.491 0.074 0.029 0.406
Original Training & Unem 0.116 0.566 0.214 0.104
State Training & Empl 0.019 0.123 0.509 0.349
Employed 0.057 0.006 0.063 0.875







Unemployed 0.742 0.055 0.013 0.189
Original Training & Unem 0.071 0.781 0.120 0.027
State Training & Empl 0.007 0.055 0.774 0.164
Employed 0.030 0.003 0.035 0.932
Table 2.10: The Distribution of Unobserved Heterogeneity: Unobserved

















that belong to Type II with the estimated µ2 equals to -0.03.
This unobserved preference difference generates assorted decisions when immi-
grants face the four mutually exclusive and exhaustive states. Compared to Type I
immigrants, Type II immigrants are more likely to be in the state of training and
employed; they also receive a higher wage in the labour market if employed.
2.6 Summary and conclusions
This paper has examined the determinants of training opportunities for newly
arrived immigrants in Canada, as well as the effects of the accumulation of human
capital on wages. This has been done by using a discrete choice sequential deci-
sion model. This model allows to estimate immigrant post-migration human capital
investment decisions jointly with wage outcomes. This framework allows for the inclu-
sion of the correlated unobserved heterogeneity into the econometric analysis. Thus,
post-migration human capital investment and accumulated stocks of human capital
are treated as potentially endogenous.
The empirical results of this paper are consistent with the previous research that
address these issues. Among the estimated determinants, pre-migration human capi-
tal, including both education and occupation in the country of origin, plays a key role
in determining the post-migration human capital investment among newly arrived im-
migrants in Canada. For immigrants that participate in training, they usually engage
in training quickly after they have landed in Canada. Furthermore, immigrants with
a higher proficiency in one of Canadian official languages are more active in training
and acquiring ready employment, controlling for all the other factors.
The states of post-migration human capital investment are persistent for the newly
arrived immigrants in the sample of LSIC. Accumulated periods of training increases
an immigrant’s realized utility from the corresponding state. The estimated transition
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matrix confirms the presence of a transition from training to employment.
The effects of pre- and post-migration human capital on wages are similar to their
effects on realized utility. Foreign education, proficiency in one of the Canadian official
languages, and the accumulation of work experience in Canada, increases immigrants’
expected wage when they are employed.
This paper reveals that unobserved heterogeneity has significant effects on the
training and employment choices of immigrants in the first years after landing. The
empirical results have important policy implications concerning immigrant observed
heterogeneities. Although the proportion of immigrants that come from traditional
countries is consistently decreasing, these immigrants are more integrated to the
Canadian economy. In general, they receive more utility from the state of train-
ing and employment, compared to immigrants that come from developing countries.
They are also more likely to locate employment in the first four years after landing
in Canada.
Consistent with previous research, an immigrant’s social capital is important in
helping immigrants to find ready employment. Compared to economic class im-
migrants, family class immigrants receive more realized utility from employment.
Refugees are, not surprisingly, in the worst situation in the first four years after land-
ing, compared to family class immigrants and immigrants that migrated for economic
reasons. However, the long-run effects are worth for further investigation.
The largest marginal effects on immigrant realized utility come from immigrant
language ability and white-collar occupations for immigrants that are employed after
landing. When an immigrant with higher proficiency in one of the Canadian official
languages, or he or she has been employed in a white-collar occupation in the country
of origin, he or she is better off in the state of employment, compared to the other
labour market states.
This paper also confirms the significant effect of post-migration human capital
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investment on immigrants’ transition into employment. When an immigrant is in
training in one period, he or she is more likely to become employed in the next
period. This implies that, along with choosing immigrants that fit the demand of
Canadian labour market, investment in immigrant training programs improves im-
migrants’ economic assimilation and therefore their contribution to the Canadian
economy.
Finally, younger immigrants are more likely to invest in post-migration human
capital and, therefore, are in a much better position to assimilate into the Canadian
society economically.
To summarize, while selecting migration applicants that applied from outside of
Canada, Canadian immigration policies should emphasize the following characteris-
tics: younger applicants with more years of education, higher proficiency in one of
the official Canadian languages, and those that worked in a white-collar occupation
in the country of origin. This has been suggested by the empirical analysis that re-
sults from the sample data extracted from LSIC, and it is consistent with previous
research. Canadian immigration policies should also provide more training opportu-
nities to newly landed immigrants. This will help immigrants transfer from the state
of unemployment to becoming employed in the first years after landing. Immigrants,
therefore, would be able to contribute more to the development of Canadian economy.
This paper extends the understanding of the behavior of newly landed immigrants
in Canada within the first years after landing. Furthermore, it confirms the existence
of heterogeneity among immigrants. This paper also provides new evidence for the
effects of immigrants’ heterogeneity on the participation in training.
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Chapter 3
Essay 2: Occupational Decisions




This paper uses a discrete choice sequential decision model to analyze the occu-
pational decisions of newly arrived immigrants and their labour-market assimilation
in the first years after landing in Canada. While most research in the economics
of immigration concentrates on the wage gap between immigrants and natives, this
wage gap is to a large extent driven by occupational differences. Using data from the
Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada, this paper identifies the determinants
of immigrant occupational choices and the effects on their wage increments. Evidence
shows that the economic class immigrants has acquired more utility from working in
white-collar occupations over others. Occupational outcomes are persistent for every
immigrant: the longer an immigrant stays at a low occupational level or is unem-
ployed, the harder it is for that immigrant to move up along the economic and social
ladder. The implications of the empirical results for immigrant selection criteria and
integration policy are also discussed.
Key Words: occupational mobility, sequential decision model, endogeneity, post-
migration human capital investment, assimilation of immigrants
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3.1 Introduction
Labour market assimilation is of major importance for overall immigrant social and
economic integration. Previous research (Chiswick and Miller 2007, Cohen and Eck-
stein 2008, Friedberg 2000, Green 1999) indicates that there is a tendency for as-
similation to occur rapidly when immigrants’ stock of human capital matches an
occupation’s requirements in the destination-country labour market. This is par-
ticularly important for immigrants during the first years after landing, since newly
landed immigrants are often not eligible for, or have insufficient information about
the destination country’s social welfare programs.
Low human capital transferability, lack of language proficiency and little infor-
mation about the destination-country labour market limit immigrants to find em-
ployment. Similar to young native born first entering labour market, newly arrived
immigrants appear to practice a job-shopping (Johnson, 1978) behaviour. And they,
most often, experience a downward shift of occupational status, compared with the
occupation they held just before migration. This is particularly the reality for people
that emigrated from a developing country and landed with a limited budget. These
immigrants are forced to accept an offer that is different with their intended occupa-
tion, in order to balance family budget or to avoid dissaving.
The downward shift of immigrants’ occupational statuses in the destination coun-
try unavoidably affects their labour market income. This contributes to the en-
try wage gap between immigrants and their native-born counterparts. Some immi-
grants are able to complement their source-country human capital by investing on
the destination-country human capital, such as formal education or training. They
also accumulate the human capital specific to the destination-country labour market
through collecting labour market information and working on the market. The accu-
mulated human capital in the destination country helps immigrants find employment
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in an occupation that better matches their stock of human capital. These immigrants
therefore experience a move up along the career ladder and are able to transfer their
occupational mobility into wage mobility.
Even though occupations have an important role in determining immigrant labour
market income, previous empirical research has generally ignored occupation. A
possible reason is that both occupation and labour market income are correlated with
unobserved heterogeneity (Chiswick and Miller, 2007). If this correlation is ignored,
estimates will be biased and inconsistent. To deal with this issue, this paper adopts
a discrete choice sequential decision model. This model estimates the effects for both
occupation and wage, in the presence of both observed and unobserved heterogeneity
among immigrants. The categorical occupations also fit naturally with the setup of
this model’s discrete occupational choices. To my knowledge, there are few researchers
that combine both occupation and labour market income into estimation for the
analysis of newly landed Canadian immigrants, under the consideration of unobserved
heterogeneity.
The empirical results suggest that while pre- and post-migration human capital
determine both immigrant occupational states and labour market income, unobserved
heterogeneity is also a decisive factor in determining immigrants’ early assimilation.
Other than working in wage employment such as white- or blue-collar occupations,
self-employment is also an important occupation for immigrants. Finally, the res-
idential area where an immigrant lives after landing is crucial to that immigrant’s
assimilation. The provincial unemployment rate influences both immigrants’ occupa-
tional decisions and their labour market income.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides a brief descrip-
tion of the existing literature; Section 3.3 presents the model and special determinants
considered in the paper ; Section 3.4 describes the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants
to Canada (LSIC) and certain features of the sample; Section 3.5 presents the em-
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pirical results estimated from the models described in Section 3.3; and Section 3.6
provides a summary of the conclusions.
3.2 Literature Review
For some time labour economists have noticed the importance of immigrants’ occu-
pation on their assimilation. However, there has been relatively little research on this
topic and a generally accepted conclusion has not been reached. Richmond (1967) and
Chiswick (1977) are the first to explore this topic and to notice the initially downward
shift of occupational status with a recovery thereafter. Green (1999) finds the first
few years after landing are crucial to an immigrant’s final occupation status. And
Cohen and Eckstein (2008) reports that the initial job is an important determinant
for immigrants’ occupations in the destination-country labour market.
Chiswick, Lee and Miller (2005) propose a U-shaped pattern of immigrant oc-
cupational mobility, when comparing the last occupation before migration with the
first occupation after landing in the destination country and thereafter. The U-
shaped occupational mobility is due to imperfect human capital transferability be-
tween countries. Newly landed immigrants can be at a disadvantageous position in
the destination-country labour market when competing with their native-born coun-
terparts. Immigrants often lack the human capital that is specific to the destination-
county labour market. They lack official language proficiency. And their credentials
received from developing countries may not be accepted in the destination labour
market. Immigrants therefore are more likely to experience a decline of occupational
status initially. They also undergo a recovery afterward as a result of accumulating
the human capital specific to the destination-country labour market.
The U-shape pattern is different across immigrants. The depth of the initial down-
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ward shift and the improvement thereafter depend on the extent of human capital
transferability. It results from the socio-economic similarity between the source and
the destination country. When the source country’s culture, language, education sys-
tem and economic structure are similar to the destination country’s, it is easier to
transfer human capital across boundaries. That is typically the case for people that
migrate between developed countries. However, human capital transferability would
be much lower when the source and the destination country share little similarity.
That is the case of immigrants from developing countries. Therefore, immigrants
coming from developed countries have a shallower downward shift of their occupation,
due to their highly accepted foreign human capital. However, immigrants emigrated
from developing countries experience a deeper downward shift of their occupational
status, especially in the first few years after landing.
Immigrants’ attributes also influence the depth of the downward shift of occu-
pational status. Economic immigrants have the shallowest decline of occupational
status. The reasons are their economic motivation for migration and the selection
criteria of the immigration policy at the destination country. The selection crite-
ria mostly depends on immigrant potential human capital, such as age, education,
language proficiency, work experience, etc, and immigrant adaptive ability to the
country’s labour market. Refugees and family reunion immigrants face a steeper de-
cline in their occupational status after landing. Rather than motivated by economic
reasons, their migration decisions are more likely due to social unrest, political or
family reasons. They therefore possess comparatively less transferable human capital
than the economic immigrants. Among them, refugees have the steepest decline of
occupational status. Recovery depends on the post-migration human capital invest-
ment. Other things equal, immigrants with more foreign education are more likely to
experience a steeper recovery.
Chiswick, Lee and Miller (2005) use Australian longitudinal data to analyze immi-
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grant occupational mobility. In order to reveal the relationship between immigrant’s
observable characteristics and the change of their occupations, Chiswick, Lee and
Miller (2005) construct a continuous variable, ANU31 as the dependent variable to
replicate the categorical occupations. The econometric model they use for analysis
is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Their empirical results support the hypothesis of
immigrant’s U-shaped occupational mobility.
Green (1999) provides evidence on Canadian immigrants’ occupational mobility.
He also discusses the economic contribution of immigrants to Canadian economy. Us-
ing data from three censuses and a multinomial logistic model, Green (1999) finds
that Canadian immigrants are overrepresented in highly skilled occupations and un-
derrepresented in less skilled occupations. Highly skilled occupations include profes-
sional occupations and low skilled occupations include sale service, blue collar jobs,
etc. Green (1999) notices that the first three years after landing are crucial in deter-
mining immigrants’ lifetime occupation. Either immigrants quickly move away from
low-skilled occupations, or unemployment, to highly skilled occupations, or they will
be trapped in these low-skilled occupations with a low wage after this period.
Green (1999) also finds that immigrants are comparatively more adaptable to eco-
nomic structural change than their native counterparts. He points out that every im-
migrant cohort experience a massive move away from blue-collar jobs to white-collar
occupations in the late 1980s; however, this pattern was not observed for Canadian
born over the same period. This cannot be explained by a normal assimilation pro-
cess.
Finally, Green (1999) identifies some characteristics that are very important in
determining immigrants’ assimilation. Similar with the conclusion in Chiswick, Lee
and Miller (2005), Canadian economic immigrants are more likely to work in highly
1The method was developed by Jones (1989), which measures relative difference in labour market
power, occupation prestige requirements and rewards.
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skilled occupations2. Even though they also experience an unemployed period or
initially work in a low skilled occupation, most of them transfer to a professional
occupation. Other immigrant groups are concentrated in low-skilled occupations. As
to language effect, although fluency in one of the Canadian official languages influence
immigrant occupational mobility, improvement of fluency after landing has nearly no
effect. When an immigrant is not fluent in either of the Canadian official languages
at the time of landing, he is more likely to work in an occupation that characterizes
with job requirement on low skilled labour. This immigrant is also less likely to move
to a highly skilled or professional occupation, even if his language skills improved.
However, immigrants with a high proficiency in one of the Canadian official languages,
either English or French, at the time of landing experience a quick transition among
occupations and most end up with work in professional occupations.
In a departure from reduced-form models, Cohen and Eckstein (2008) uses a
dynamic model to analyze immigrant labour market decisions. With Israeli longi-
tudinal data for newly landed immigrants, Cohen and Eckstein (2008) assumes that
immigrants maximize their life time utility through choosing one of five labour mar-
ket states in each period. The labour market states are unemployed, training in
white-collar occupations, training in blue-collar occupations, work in white-collar oc-
cupations, and work in blue-collar occupations. Their empirical results suggest that
the imported human capital, including foreign education and potential foreign work
experience, has zero return in the Israeli labour market. However, the acquired hu-
man capital from the Israeli labour market determines the probability of a job offer
and the wage level for immigrants. In particular, participating in white-collar (blue-
collar) occupational training has a positive and significant effect on increasing the
probability of a job offer in white-collar (blue-collar) occupations. Training also in-
creases immigrant wage level in the corresponding occupation. While accumulated
2Eckstein and Weiss (1998) discuss the immigrant skills and the absorption of the destination-
country (Israel) labour market.
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Israeli work experience increases the immigrant wage, it decreases the probability of
a job offer in both white- and blue-collar occupations. However, Cohen and Eckstein
(2008) does not separate local work experience acquired from white- or blue-collar
occupations. They simply consider a general Israeli work experience.
Another important conclusion from Cohen and Eckstein (2008) is the persistence
of occupational state. Once an immigrant works in a blue collar occupation, it is hard
for that immigrant to transfer to a white-collar occupation, let alone those that are
currently unemployed.
3.3 A Structural Model of Occupational Decisions
3.3.1 Model Setup
This paper assumes that individuals maximize expected lifetime utility by choosing
the optimal state over a finite horizon T . Lifetime utility is time additive, and there
are K mutually exclusive and exhaustive states in each period t ∈ [0, T ]. Given this,
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Following an approach similar to Cameron and Heckman (2001), this paper ap-
proximates the alternative specific value functions using a flexible functional form.
Thus, the intertemporal utility of choosing a given state k in period t is assumed to
be of the following form
V kt = X
′
tθkt + γktTR + δktEXt + ϕk + ε
k
t (3)
for k =1, 2, 3 and 4, where X are known characteristics of immigrants. TR denotes
whether an immigrant has finished training before period t or not, while EX denotes
accumulated work experience in period t since arrival in Canada. The parameters
δkt capture the structural effects of accumulated work experience on the utility of
choosing option k in period t. The term ϕk is a state specific unobserved hetero-
geneity term that represents individual differences in tastes for different occupational
decisions.
In order to estimate the model, some restrictions are needed. These restrictions
reflect the necessity to keep the number of parameters at a manageable level as well
as the necessity to hold the model to a certain level of coherency. In particular, to
reduce the number of parameters, this paper assumes that the vectors of parameters
θkt, γkt and δkt remain constant over time. Moreover, individual heterogeneity is
parameterized as follows:
ϕk = α1k + α2k ∗ µ ∀ k ∈ [1, K] (4)
where µ is an individual specific random variable and its distribution is approximated
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by a discrete distribution with two points of support (µ1 and µ2). The type proba-
bilities are estimated using logistic transformation. In order to obtain identification,
µ1 is normalized to equal zero and α21 to equal one. Finally, this paper assumes that
εkt represents a pure stochastic i.i.d. shock on an individual’s utility in period t.
Given the above assumptions, the probability of choosing state k in period t, given
all available information at that period is
Pr(dkt = 1|X, d
k
t−1, µ) =









The model is estimated using maximum likelihood techniques. The type specific
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3.3.2 The Determinants
This paper adopts a general concept to treat occupational categories as follows: white-
collar occupations and blue-collar occupations. This is consistent with previous re-
search that looks at occupation and wage changes (Cohen and Eckstein, 2008), and
the collection method of the LSIC. The LSIC adopts a retrospective method in order
to collect data over a long time interval. This unavoidably introduces measurement
error when people recall their occupations, particularly for immigrants that have fre-
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quently changed jobs since landing. The aggregation of occupational categories, i.e.
white- and blue-collar occupations, reduce the measurement error problem. It also
reduce the computational burden for structural analysis.
This paper also considers self-employment as an occupational choice. Much pre-
vious research omits self-employment. This is due to the fact that there may be large
measurement error for the number of working hours associated with self-employment,
and therefore, it is difficult to separate the return of human capital from the return of
physical work and entrepreneurial ability. However, approximate 10% of respondents
in LSIC are self-employed at the end of the survey. Excluding them may result in
selection bias.
As Green (1999) suggests, immigrants are more flexible or vulnerable to macro-
economic changes. They may quickly respond to changes in the structure of the
economy, and fill a newly generated opportunity. Conversely, they may be the first
to feel the negative impact when economy growth slows down. Therefore, the quar-
terly provincial unemployment rate is included in this analysis. Other conventional
determinants such as age, foreign education, and other demographic variables, are
also included in the analysis.
In the research that has been done on immigrant’s occupational changes (Cohen
and Eckstein 2008; Chiswick, Lee and Miller, 2005; Toussaint-Comeau, 2006; Grenier
and Li, 2010), there is not a standard procedure to classify occupations. This makes
the construction of the occupational index relatively arbitrary.
The direct comparison of the occupational categories in the source country and
the destination country (Grenier and Li, 2010) relies on a strong assumption: the
structure and the requirements of the labour market are the same or have a very
close similarity between the source and the destination country. However, this is
unlikely, especially when considering the differences between the labour markets in
developed and developing countries. Previous research reveals that the return to for-
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eign education is very low (Friedberg, 2000) and the return to foreign work experience
is close to zero (Miller, 1992). This implies that the human capital that is acquired
through education and work experience is specific to a country. This unavoidably af-
fects an immigrant’s occupational outcomes in the destination country. It also lowers
the probability that an immigrant find employment in their intended occupation.
Another method that is used in order to capture the occupational differences
between the source country and the destination country is to convert discrete oc-
cupational categories into a continuous measure (Chiswick, Lee and Miller, 2005;
Toussaint-Comeau, 2006). However, there is no generally accepted index for this
conversion. Moreover, this method also leads to an high frequency of switching occu-
pations that is not realistic of the overall population.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 The Survey
The data that is utilized in this paper are extracted from the Longitudinal Survey
of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC), which is administered jointly by Citizenship and
Immigration Canada (CIC) and Statistics Canada. LSIC is designed to provide infor-
mation pertaining to how newly landed immigrants establish their economic, social,
and cultural ties to Canadian society during their first years in Canada. The survey
therefore excludes the individuals that applied and landed from within Canada. It
covers a four year survey period, starting from April 1, 2001 and ending on September
30, 20053.
The survey respondents were chosen randomly among immigrants that arrived
3LSIC User Guide (WWW.23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb-bmdi/pub/docu-
ment/4422_d1_t1_v1-eng.pdf).
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in Canada between October 1, 2000 and September 30, 2001, 15 years of age or
older at the time of landing, and landed from outside of Canada. Those immigrants
that were chosen for the survey were interviewed within a six-month period from
the date of landing to interview. Interviews were conducted three times within a
four-year period after their arrival. Data collection for the first wave began in April
2001 and ended in May 2002. Approximately 12,000 newly landed immigrants were
interviewed. It represents approximately 164,200 of the 250,000 individuals admitted
to Canada during the period. The survey population cover all Census Metropolitan
Areas (CMA) and non-remote Census Agglomerations (CA). The second and third
wave of interview were held at the end of the second and fourth year after the date
of landing. The second survey included around 9,300 immigrants, while in the third
survey the sample dropped to 7,700.
Compared to other commonly used data sources for immigration studies, such
as the Canadian Census of Population and other large-scale cross-sectional surveys,
LSIC has a comparative advantage. Besides detailed information on age, sex, mother
tongue, country of origin, visa type, knowledge of English/French etc., LSIC provides
information on the immigrant’s formal education, both foreign and Canadian, and a
wide range of training.
LSIC also contains detailed information on the employment history of the immi-
grant after landing as well as information on pre-migration occupation. Occupational
information includes both industry unit groups, based on North American Industry
Classification (NAICS 1997), and occupation unit groups, based on Standard Occu-
pation Classification System (SOC 1991). The North American Industry Classifica-
tion System (NAICS) is an industry classification system developed by the statistical
agencies of Canada, Mexico and the United States. It contains four digits to repre-
sents a hierarchical structure of a production oriented industry classification system.
NAICS divides the economy into 20 sectors at the highest level; it further distin-
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1 58.18 13.66 26.54 1.63 3555
2 34.69 19.49 43.28 2.54 3555
3 31.40 21.45 43.85 3.30 3555
4 32.10 22.55 41.42 3.93 3555
5 31.24 23.45 41.18 4.12 3555
6 29.39 24.30 41.86 4.45 3555
7 27.35 25.02 42.82 4.80 3555
8 23.61 26.27 44.73 5.39 3555
9 21.12 26.98 45.76 6.13 3555
10 21.58 27.57 44.34 6.51 3170
11 21.93 28.66 42.71 6.70 2979
12 21.36 29.14 42.27 7.23 2979
13 20.78 29.51 42.05 7.66 2979
14 19.65 30.06 42.00 8.29 2979
15 17.29 31.00 42.95 8.76 2979
16 14.47 32.06 44.23 9.25 2979
guishes the different economic activities in which businesses are engaged at lower
levels. Lastly and perhaps most importantly, the longitudinal characteristics of LSIC
make structural model to analyze a series of changes for occupational decisions in the
destination-country labour market.
3.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
This research extracts a sub-sample from the LSIC that includes only male immigrants
between the ages of 18 and 45 at the time of the first interview. The age restriction
is imposed in order to avoid capturing the proportion of the population that attends
compulsory schooling (i.e., young adults), as well as the proportion of population
that is in the process of making retirement decisions in each of the four survey years.
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Individuals that only participated in the first two waves of the survey are retained
in the sample, which generates an unbalanced panel. With a focus on labour market
assimilation, immigrants that are not active in labour market are dropped from the
sample. In total, there are 3,555 individuals observed for approximately 16 quarters
(See Table 3.1) 4.
Table 3.1 shows the proportion of newly arrived immigrants in four mutually ex-
clusive and exhaustive labour market states: Unemployed and Searching, Employed in
White-collar Occupations, Employed in Blue-collar Occupations, and Self-Employed.
Table 3.1 shows that during the first quarter after landing, 58 percent of immigrants
were unemployed. Among the employed immigrants, the majority worked in blue-
collar occupations, around 27 percent. Furthermore, some 14 percent worked in
white-collar occupations and about two percent were self-employed.
The percentage of immigrants that are employed in blue-collar occupations in-
creases to some 43 percent in the second quarter after landed in Canada, with small
fluctuations around this number thereafter. The number of unemployed immigrants
decreases steadily after the second quarter. Moreover, it drops to approximately 14
percent in the 16th quarter, four years after landing in Canada. Corresponding to the
drop in the number of unemployed immigrants, the number of immigrants that are
employed in white-collar occupations, or being self-employed, is steadily increasing.
At the end of survey period, around 32 percent of immigrants work in white-collar oc-
cupations and nine percent are self-employed. However, compared to approximately
56 percent of immigrants that worked in a white-collar occupation in their country
of origin (See Table 3.2), the fraction of immigrants that are working in white-collar
occupations after moving to Canada is still comparatively low.
As Table 3.2 indicates, the average age for immigrants that work in white-collar
occupations in Canada is not apparently different from the full sample. However,
4The LSIC oversampled refugees, therefore survey weights are used in this paper.
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Marriage (%) 71.6 76.4 68.0 82.8
Source country white-
collar occupation (%)
55.5 79.8 41.5 64.4
Average weekly wage










immigrants that work in white-collar occupations acquired more formal education
before migrating to Canada (17.1 years), is higher than that of immigrants who work
in blue-collar occupations (14.5 years), or that are self-employed (15.3 years). Immi-
grants that are employed in white-collar occupations take approximately six months
to find their first main job after landing in Canada, which is shorter than immigrants
that work in blue-collar occupations (roughly seven months), and immigrants that
are self-employed (eight months). Self-employed immigrants however, are older, more
likely to be married, have more children, and wait longer to find their first main job.
This may indicate that, compared to the rest immigrants, it is much more difficult
for immigrants that are self-employed to find employment in the Canadian labour
market.
Table 3.2 shows that immigrants are distinctive to each other in terms of occupa-
tions. The fraction of immigrants that were employed in white-collar occupations in
their country of origin is 56 percent in total. Approximately 80 percent of immigrants
who worked in white-collar occupations in their country of origin work in white-collar
occupations in Canada. The corresponding proportion of immigrants that work in
blue-collar occupations in Canada is about 42 percent. Interestingly, approximately
64 percent of self-employed immigrants were employed in white-collar occupations in
their country of origin.
There are notable wage differences among immigrants that work in different oc-
cupations. The average weekly wage of immigrants’ first main job after arriving in
Canada is $750 for immigrants that work in white-collar occupations in Canada. This
is higher than the average wage calculated for the full sample, $532 per week, and
is also higher than the average weekly wage among immigrants in blue-collar occu-
pations and those that are self-employed. The average weekly wage for immigrants
in blue-collar occupations is $412 per week, while the average weekly wage among
immigrants that are self-employed is $610 per week. The average weekly wage of
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immigrants, combined with the level of foreign education, implies that a positive re-
lationship may exist between the acquisition human capital before arriving in Canada
and post-migration occupational states.
3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 The Effects of Human Capital and Local Macro Eco-
nomic Environment on Immigrant Realized Utility from
Each Occupation
Table 3.3 presents the effects of human capital on immigrant occupational states. It
includes the human capital that is acquired in the country of origin and the human
capital that is obtained in Canada. Due to the non-linearity of the model, it is difficult
to interpret these estimates. Marginal effects are therefore calculated and are added
next to the original estimates.
Consistent with existing literature, the acquisition of foreign education has an
important effect on the occupational states of landed immigrants in Canada. More
foreign education helps immigrants move up the career ladder in Canada. Educated
immigrants receive more utility from working in a white-collar occupation in Canada.
However, an additional year of foreign education decreases immigrants’ realized
utility when he or she works in a blue-collar occupation or is self-employed in Canada.
Considering the average length of education is 15 years, equivalent to approximately
college level, and more than 50 percent immigrants hold a white-collar occupation
before migrating to Canada in the full sample (42 percent for immigrants working
in blue-collar occupations and 64 percent for self-employed immigrants), working in
a blue-collar occupation in the destination country unavoidably decreases an immi-
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Table 3.3: The Effects of Human Capital Parameters and Local Macro Eco-










































































































Proficiency in one of Canadian official languages has positive effect on an immi-
grant’s occupational status. Compared to working in blue-collar occupations or being
self-employed, immigrants that speak fluently one of the Canadian official languages,
English or French, receive more utility from working in white-collar occupations.
Besides requiring more formal education and professional training, white-collar oc-
cupations demand higher language proficiency than blue-collar occupations and self-
employment. Proficiency in English or French also helps immigrants transfer their
acquired foreign human capital to the specific human capital that can be utilized in
the Canadian labour market.
The occupation that an immigrant held right before they migrated to Canada has
a similar effect as foreign education and language proficiency. Compared to the refer-
ence group, immigrants that never worked in their country of origin, immigrants that
held a white-collar occupation right before migrating to Canada are at a higher util-
ity level, if they are employed in white-collar occupations in Canada. However, these
immigrants are no different with the reference group when they work in blue-collar
occupations, or they are self-employed after landing in Canada. The contribution to
utility in working in blue-collar occupations or being self-employed is not significant.
Immigrants that held a blue-collar job in their country of origin receive more
utility from working in blue-collar occupations after landed in Canada, compared to
immigrants that never worked in their country of origin. However, the difference is
insignificant if they are employed in white-collar occupations or being self-employed,
compared to the reference group.
The acquired Canadian human capital also influences immigrants’ occupational
states. Although immigrants that participate in training after landing usually pur-
sue training more than one time, the first training period is effective in influencing
immigrants’ occupational states. Compared with the reference state, unemployed
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and searching for jobs, trained immigrants receive more utility from working in one
of the three employment states. Among them, training contributes the most utility
to immigrants that work in blue-collar occupations. The contribution of training
to utility is not significant for immigrants that are self-employed. This reveals that
self-employment is the last resort for those immigrants that fail to secure a wage
employment, a result consistent with the small number of self-employed immigrants
in the dataset extracted from the LSIC.
The effect of acquired Canadian work experience on utility is specific to occupa-
tions. The marginal effect of accumulating white-collar work experience positively
affects an immigrant’s realized utility if that immigrant keeps working in white-collar
occupations. However, it has a negative effect on an immigrant’s utility if he or she
is employed in a blue-collar occupation. The marginal effect of accumulating white-
collar work experience on immigrants’ realized utility level is close to zero when they
are self-employed.
The accumulation of blue-collar work experience has similar effects on immigrants’
realized utility as the accumulated Canadian white-collar work experience. The ac-
cumulated blue-collar work experience increases an immigrant’s realized utility when
he or she works in a blue-collar occupation. It decreases that immigrant’s realized
utility when he or she switches to a white-collar occupation.
Although the results are insignificant, an immigrant’s accumulated periods of
self-employment decreases his or her utility if he or she works in a white-collar occu-
pation or a blue-collar occupation. Accumulated periods of self-employment only has
a positive effect on an immigrant’s realized utility if that immigrant is keeping to be
self-employed. This confirms that self-employment is the last resort of employment
for immigrants that decide to continue to stay in Canada, at least in the first four
years after landing.
The above results imply that occupational states play a major part in determining
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immigrants’ occupational choices–the longer an immigrant is employed in a specific
occupation, the harder it is for that immigrant to switch to another occupation, or
climb up the career ladder. Lastly, the accumulation of periods of unemployment
decreases an immigrant’s realized utility in every occupational states. This reflects
the result of depreciated human capital.
The local macro-economic environment is also a key factor in the decision of an
immigrant’s occupational state. When the provincial unemployment rate is high, it
decreases the realized utility for all immigrants that are employed. Among them,
immigrants that work in blue-collar occupations are affected the most. However,
the marginal effect of the provincial unemployment rate for immigrants that are
self-employed is not significant.
3.5.2 The Effects of Individual Characteristics, Immigrant
Classes, and the Occupational State of the Previous
Period on Immigrant Realized Utility from Each Oc-
cupation
Table 3.4 reports the effects of individual characteristics, immigration classes, and
the labour market states in the previous period. The estimates reveal that with an
additional year of age, an immigrant’s utility significantly decreases from working
in a white-collar occupation. Elder immigrants, however, are inclined to work in a
blue-collar occupation, or to be self-employed. This may reflect that the older an
immigrant becomes, the harder it is to transfer foreign human capital and to be
utilized in the Canadian labour market. Marital status also has an impact; married
immigrants prefer to work in a white-collar occupation, or to be self-employed. An
additional dependent child has no significant effect on immigrant occupational states.
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As for immigrant classes, refugees have the poorest outcomes within the first four
years after landing in Canada, when compared to economic and family class immi-
grants. Economic class immigrants are at a disadvantaged in blue-collar occupations
when compared to family class immigrants. This may reflect the effect of family con-
nections, and thus the availability and the utilization of labour market information in
the Canadian labour market. However, economic class immigrants locate at a higher
utility level when they are employed in white-collar occupations. Economic immi-
grants are statistically indifferent compared to family class immigrants when looking
at self-employment.
Economic immigrants that migrate with high economic motivation, and under the
selection of Canadian immigration policy, are able to transfer their foreign human cap-
ital to local human capital more easily. Compared to refugees and family immigrants,
they receive more utility from working in white-collar occupations, controlling for all
other factors. This implies that economic immigrants are the most able to assimilate
into the Canadian economy during the first four years after landing.
3.5.3 The Effects of Country of Origin and Residential Re-
gion in Canada on Immigrant Realized Utility from
Each Occupation
Table 3.5 reports the effects of immigrants’ country of origin on their occupational
states. Immigrants that come to Canada from regions, such as Northern and Eastern
European, Africa, Asia, and South America, do not assimilate as well in the Canadian
labour market for all three occupations, compared to immigrants that come from the
U.S., UK and Western Europe. This result is consistent with previous research that
looks at occupational status and how it is affected by the transferability of human
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Table 3.4: The Effects of Individual Characteristics, Immigrant Classes, and
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capital across countries (Chiswick, Lee and Miller, 2005).
Table 3.6 presents the effects of a residential region on immigrants’ occupational
states. Using Ontario as the reference group, there is no obvious occupational differ-
ence among immigrants that live in other provinces in Canada5. This is indicated by
insignificant estimates. Exceptions are some occupations located in Quebec, Alberta,
British Columbia and Atlantic Canada. Compared with immigrants that live in On-
tario, Quebec immigrants receive less utility from working in white-collar occupations
or being self-employed. Interestingly, immigrants move to Alberta are less inclined to
work in blue-collar occupations. Immigrants that live in BC or one of the provinces
in Atlantic Canada6. however, receive more utility from working in blue-collar oc-
cupations. This may reflect structural differences in economic performance across
provinces.
5The residential region does not include the northern area of Canada, due to few observations.
6Atlantic Canada includes New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Is-
land.
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3.5.4 The Determinants for Wage
Table 3.7 presents the determinants of immigrants’ expected wages, which primarily
concentrates on the effect of human capital. Foreign education has a positive effect
on immigrants’ expected wage. Controlling for other factors, each additional year of
foreign education increases the expected wage by about 3.5 percent. Proficiency in
one of the Canadian official languages also increases an immigrant’s expected labour
market income.
The accumulation of Canadian work experience also impacts immigrants’ expected
wage. The accumulation of work experience in white-collar occupations increases an
immigrants labour market income. However, the accumulation of periods of self-
employment has no significantly effect on immigrants’ labour market income. The
effect of accumulation of work experience in blue-collar occupations is also not signif-
icantly on immigrants’ labour market income. Finally, the accumulation of periods of
unemployment depreciates an immigrant‘s human capital, and therefore has a nega-
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Table 3.7: The Wage Equation
Estimates Std.Err.
Foreign education 0.035 0.001
Language 0.117 0.006







Accumulative self-employment 0.000 0.001
tive effect on immigrants’ labour market income.
3.5.5 The Estimated and Actual Transition Probability
Table 3.8 reports the estimated occupational transition matrix. The estimated struc-
tural stability rates are much lower than the actual transition matrix (Table 3.9).
This is due to the serial correlation of time invariant unobserved heterogeneity, ϕ,
that has been isolated and estimated from the structural model.
The estimated transition probability reveals that occupational states have an im-
pact on whether or not an immigrant will transfer between occupations. It is unlikely
for an immigrant to transfer from a blue-collar occupation, or from self-employment,
to a white-collar occupation. According to the results, if an immigrant is employed in
a white-collar occupation during one period, he or she will stay in white-collar occupa-
tions with a probability equal to 0.80 in the next period. The structural stability for
an immigrant to stay in blue-collar occupations is 0.84 and the corresponding prob-
ability for self-employment is 0.70. However, when an immigrant is self-employed
in one period, there is only a probability of 0.09 for that immigrant to switch to a
white-collar occupation in the next period. The lowest transitional probability to
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Table 3.8: Estimated State Transition Matrix
Destination State
Unemployed White-Collar Blue-Collar Self-Empl
Unemployed 0.564 0.141 0.259 0.036
Origin White-Collar 0.116 0.799 0.067 0.018
State Blue-Collar 0.100 0.043 0.844 0.013
Self-Employed 0.088 0.089 0.120 0.703
Table 3.9: Actual State Transition Matrix
Destination State
Unemployed White-Collar Blue-Collar Self-Empl
Unemployed 0.793 0.054 0.137 0.017
Origin White-Collar 0.018 0.974 0.006 0.002
State Blue-Collar 0.054 0.007 0.935 0.004
Self-Employed 0.012 0.006 0.010 0.973
white-collar occupations is from a blue-collar occupation, at merely 0.04. These re-
sults reveal that it is difficult for an immigrant to climb up the career ladder once he
or she has been employed in a blue-collar occupation, or self-employment.
The second highest transitional probability to white-collar occupations, other than
itself, is from unemployment. This is consistent with the finding of Eckstein and
Weiss (1998). The probability of being employed in white-collar occupations during
this period is equal to 0.14, if an immigrant is unemployed in the previous period.
For blue-collar occupations, this probability equal to 0.26. Blue-collar occupations
are also major destination occupations for immigrants who were self-employed in
the previous period. The probability of an employed immigrant in a white-collar
occupation in one period, being unemployed in the next period, is approximately
equal to 0.12.
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Table 3.10: The Distribution of Unobserved Ability: Unobserved Preference
for Occupational Choice
















Table 3.10 presents unobserved heterogeneity and its effect on both occupational
choices and their associated labour market income. With an adopted two point
system, and with µ1 fixed at zero to represent type I immigrants, the majority of
immigrants in the Canadian labour market belong to type I. Conversely, 2 percent of
immigrants7 belong to of type II with a µ2 estimated at -0.022. Compared with type
II immigrants, type I immigrants are inclined to work in white-collar occupations,
while type II immigrants receive more utility from working in blue-collar occupations
or by being self-employed. The estimated unobserved heterogeneity among immi-
grants positively affects immigrants’ expected labour market income, while holding
other factors constant.
The existence of unobserved heterogeneity among immigrants reveals the diversity
of immigrants and its effect on their assimilation paths. Some immigrants face more
7Calculated based on logistic expression: exp(q)/(1+exp(q)) with q equal to -3.906.
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Table 3.11: The Difference between Actual and Predicted Occupational












1 0.052 0.028 0.026 0.002
2 0.089 0.022 0.070 0.002
3 0.009 0.016 0.007 0.000
4 0.015 0.015 0.030 0.000
5 0.005 0.015 0.016 0.004
6 0.003 0.018 0.012 0.003
7 0.009 0.020 0.008 0.003
8 0.027 0.028 0.007 0.000
9 0.025 0.026 0.000 0.002
10 0.001 0.024 0.025 0.000
11 0.007 0.024 0.031 0.000
12 0.002 0.028 0.025 0.001
13 0.002 0.029 0.026 0.001
14 0.006 0.031 0.025 0.000
15 0.024 0.037 0.012 0.002
16 0.037 0.042 0.004 0.002
difficulty than the others in finding employment in white-collar occupations when
entering the Canadian labour market, controlling for observable characteristics.
3.5.7 Model Fit
Table 3.11 shows the absolute value between the actual distribution of labour market
activity and the ones predicted by the model. The model perfectly predicted the
immigrants that choose self-employment as their occupation. The difference of the
distribution between the predicted and the actual self-employed immigrants in the
first sixteen quarters (four years after landing) is less than half percentage points8.
Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of actual and predicted immigrants that work in
8Please also see Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: The Actual and Predicted Distribution of Self-employment
white- and blue-collar occupations. The model under-predicts immigrants that work
in white-collar occupations, and in general, the model over-predicts immigrants that
work in blue-collar occupations. However, if immigrants that work in white-collar
occupations or blue-collar occupations are combined into one large group, wage em-
ployment, the difference between the actual and the predicted distribution becomes
very small (Please see Figure 3.3).
3.6 Summary and Conclusions
This paper has examined the determinants of occupational states for newly arrived
immigrants to Canada, as well as the effects of human capital accumulation on wages.
This has been done by using a discrete choice sequential decision model where occupa-
tional states are modeled jointly with wage outcomes. This framework allows for the
inclusion of correlated unobserved heterogeneity into analysis, and estimated together
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Figure 3.2: The Actual and Predicted Distribution of White- and Blue-collar
Occupations
Figure 3.3: The Actual and Predicted Distribution of Wage Employment
and Unemployment
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with other socio-economic characteristics. Thus, occupational decisions, accumulated
stocks of human capital and wage are treated as potentially endogenous.
The empirical results of this paper are consistent with previous research that
examines similar outcomes. Pre-migration human capital, including foreign education
attainment and the occupation held in the country of origin right before migrating to
Canada, plays a key role in determining immigrants’ occupational states after landing.
Specifically, immigrants with higher pre-migration human capital tend to work in
white-collar occupations. Immigrants with a high proficiency in one of Canadian
official languages also tend to work in white-collar occupations, while controlling all
the other factors.
The accumulation of Canadian work experience and labour market information
also plays a key role in determining immigrants’ occupations. Once immigrants have
completed their first training period, they have a higher utility level if they are em-
ployed in one of the three occupational states, compared to the absorbing state–
unemployment and searching. The largest marginal effect from completing training
is for immigrants that work in blue-collar occupations. The accumulation of occupa-
tional work experience in Canada has a positive effect on immigrants’ realized utility
level, if they are employed in the same occupation across survey periods. The esti-
mated transition matrix confirms that immigrants in occupational states are likely to
stay in them, which indicates that immigrants have limited occupational mobility.
The effects of pre- and post-migration human capital accumulation on immigrant
wages are similar to their effects on realized utility. The acquisition of foreign edu-
cation and language proficiency increases immigrant’s wages. Moreover, the accumu-
lation of white-collar work experience in Canada also increases immigrants’ labour
market income.
Finally, this paper confirms the existence of heterogeneity among immigrants.
This paper also provides new evidence for the effects of immigrants’ heterogeneity on
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their occupational states and wage level. The majority of immigrants prefer to work
in white-collar occupations, rather than to work in blue-collar occupations, or to be
self-employed.
This paper enlightens our understanding of newly arrived immigrants’ occupa-
tional decisions in the transition period. It suggests that self-employment is an im-
portant substitute for wage employment. Also, this paper indicates that the local
economic environment has a significant impact on immigrants’ occupational deci-
sions. All in all, finding employment soon after landing or being self-employed is very
important in helping immigrants assimilate into Canadian society.
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Chapter 4
Essay 3: Asymmetric Information
and the Immigrant Wage Gap
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ABSTRACT
This paper uses asymmetric information theory to explain the immigrant wage
gap. Employers have imperfect information concerning immigrants’ productive abil-
ity when immigrants first enter the labour market of the destination country. This
is particularly evident among immigrants that arrive from developing countries. Ev-
idence suggests that employers acquire more precise information about a worker’s
ability, the more time the immigrant spends in the labour market. Two questions
emerge: first, are there sub-groups of immigrants with different levels of productive
ability? and second, can high ability immigrants signal themselves to be rewarded
with a high initial wage, and hence yield a smaller entry wage gap and faster wage
growth thereafter? As a departure from the symmetric information analysis, this
paper provides a novel look at both the entry and catch-up effect on immigrants.




Along with an aging society and a worldwide economy, attracting high quality im-
migrants has become a trend among developed countries. Among these, Canada,
Australia, and the United States are major destination countries which attract two-
thirds of legal immigrants around the world.
The quality of immigrants is not only an economic issue but also a social issue.
Immigrants with a large stock of human capital and productive ability have a com-
plementary effect on creating low level jobs. They also contribute directly to the
economy of the destination country, by increasing tax income, introducing advanced
skills and novel ideas, and so on. Immigrants with low productivity, however, influence
social attitudes and other connected issues towards the whole immigrant population,
thus influencing social stability. Although economists recognize the importance of
immigration to the economic development of the destination country, social recog-
nition for this conclusion is far from reached (Card, Dustmann and Preston, 2010).
Immigrant social welfare dependence and competition in the low-level labour market
attract a good deal of social comment. This can lead to social tension, particularly
when economic development slows down.
Unlike American immigration policies, which concentrates on family reunion,
Canadian immigration policies emphasize the applicant’s potential human capital1
and the demand for particular skills in the Canadian labour market, both in the
short- or long-run. Only people that work in designated occupations are permitted
for migration to Canada. Borjas (1990) notes that Canada has drawn better immi-
grants than the U.S. Since the adverse selection of U.S. immigrants (Borjas, 1987)
may certainly happen, it is interesting to ask the following question: what immigrant
125 points are allocated to foreign education, 21 to foreign work experience and 16 for language
proficiency; there is another 10 points for Canadian education and work experience. In total, there
are 72 points assigned to applicant’s potential human capital. For a total of 100 with 67 being the
passing score, the rest 28 points are allocated to other aspects, such as whether the applicant has
relatives in Canada or not, etc.
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quality has the Canadian immigration policy selected, particularly in recent years?
This paper extends the work of Gibbons and Katz (1991) and Kahn (2009) on
the employer learning model to immigrant selection issues. Using data from the
Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC), this paper identifies whether
asymmetric information is prevalent in the Canadian labour market. This paper also
bridges the gap between asymmetric information theory and empirical analysis on the
topic of immigrant selection and integration. It also offers quantitative evidence that
is consistent with the predictions derived directly from the asymmetric information
model on immigrant selection, and relating, to the case of Canada2. That is, Canadian
immigration policy may lead to the migration of both high and low productive ability
immigrants to the country at the same time. This paper identifies the effectiveness
of a few signals that reveal the ability differences among immigrants in the Canadian
labour market. It also confirms the effectiveness of these signals on immigrant labour
market performance and assimilation results. This paper therefore, provides not
only a novel look on the general topic of immigrants, but also contributes to the
corresponding implications on Canadian immigrant selection and relevant assimilation
policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 provides a brief review of
the existing literature; Section 4.3 presents the model and its background. Section 4.4
describes the special features of the LSIC, and the descriptive statistics; Section 4.5
presents the empirical estimates of the model, and the interpretations. A summary
of the conclusions are provided in Section 4.6.
2Using a structural model, Caponi (2011) provides evidence on the selection effect of Mexican
immigrants to the U.S.
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4.2 Literature Review
There is a long history of debate on the selection of immigrants, but the question has
never been settled. In his 1978 paper, Chiswick concludes that self-selected, highly
motivated immigrants take ten to fifteen years to catch up with their native counter-
parts in terms of wages. Since then, the type of immigrants selected by immigration
policies has been a major concern to labour economists and policy makers. Using
data from various countries and sources, there are numerous papers published on this
topic, see for example Borjas, 1987 and 1991; Chiswick, 1978 and 1999; Cobb-Clark,
1993; Bake and Benjamin, 1994; Bratsberg, 1995; Butcher and DiNardo, 2002; Green
and Worswick 2004.
Models based on standard human capital theory assume that observable char-
acteristics, such as education, work experience, etc, determine immigrant economic
performance in the destination country’s labour market. However, some research
findings indicate that some characteristics, such as productive ability, that are only
partially observable or completely unobservable, also impact immigrants’ labour mar-
ket outcomes. Therefore, other plausible explanations may exist if this is along with
the reality among migration issues, particularly for immigrants coming from develop-
ing countries.
While the traditional immigrant source countries are among developed countries,
such as the U.S., Britain, and Western European countries, immigrants from devel-
oping countries are relatively new in developed countries immigration history. Early
on, immigration from developing countries was often constrained by restricted quotas
and discriminating immigration laws. Most of these laws were only abolished in the
early 1960s. Canada, for instance, relaxed its immigration policy and opened up for
immigration from developing countries in 1967. Since then, Canadian immigration
policy has put a particular emphasis on immigrant potential human capital and the
demand of Canadian labour market. The U.S. abandoned its discriminating regional
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migration policy in 1965, and Australia changed it in 1966.
The change of immigration policy in Canada, and other countries, has led to a
change of immigrant composition. While 87 percent of immigrants to Canada in the
1950’s were from traditional immigration countries, approximately 50 percent were
from these countries in 1967-1973, the period following the establishment of the new
immigration policy (Parai, 1975). Over the past century, this number has continued
to drop. As of year 2000, only eight percent of immigrants who landed in Canada are
originally from traditional source countries, according to the dataset extracted from
LSIC and used in this paper.
Developed countries share similar characteristics, including a long mutual mi-
gration history, similar cultures and labour market structure, and known education
systems. This makes immigrants’ productive ability well known in the destination
country labour market. Compared with immigrants from traditional immigration
countries, immigrants from developing countries are in a disadvantageous position.
Besides the difference in culture, education system, and a less developed labour mar-
ket, early developing-country immigrants concentrate on low-level hard labour jobs.
This separates them from the main stream of society and continues to hinder the
recognition of successive immigrants.
Researchers have begun to study this issue based on the assumption of asym-
metric information. The general assumption is that immigrant productive ability is
unobservable in either the source or the destination country labour market. When
studying the migration decisions of foreign students in the U.S., Kwok and Leland
(1982) assume that U.S. employers are able to fully observe students’ productive abil-
ity. This is largely due to the knowledge of the education system and a long hiring
history. They therefore are willing to pay a wage corresponding to the real ability
level of foreign students. However, the source country employers, on the contrary,
cannot observe individual productive ability. They therefore only pay a wage corre-
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sponding to the mean of the known ability distribution for the students that studied
abroad. Kwok and Leland conclude that the high ability foreign students will stay
in the U.S. and earn a higher wage, compared to the students that go back to their
country of origin after graduation. This prediction implies that foreign students that
studied and stayed in the U.S. are the ones at the upper tail of all foreign students.
However, Katz and Stark (1984) points out, by using the Kwok and Leland’ model,
the lower tail selection will happen if the source country employers are able to observe
such students ability, instead of employers in the destination country.
Based on asymmetric information theory, Katz (1986) further addresses this topic
by developing a theoretical model. He considered three ability levels among the
source country population: high, medium and low. Katz assumes that there is a
linear relationship between ability and wages3 and that the return to ability is higher
in the destination country. He further assumes that there is a positive moving cost
of migration and that employers in the destination country are unable to observe
immigrant ability directly, although they are able to observe the ability distribution.
Thus, before a signal reveals an immigrant’s actual ability level, employers are only
willing to pay an average wage, corresponding to the mean of the known immigrant
ability distribution. Corresponding to the cost of signaling, three possible situations
would happen.
First, for a moderate signaling cost, the high ability individuals in the source
country will migrate. They will choose to signal their ability levels when the benefits
of migration overweight the costs. Consequently, the low ability individuals still
migrate, but they prefer not to signal themselves, because of the associated cost and
benefit from signaling. Therefore, migration of individuals with both high and low
ability levels takes place at this situation. Second, when the signaling cost is too high,
the individuals with high ability are not able to benefit from differentiating themselves
3Katz and Stark (1987) extended this linear model into a nonlinear relationship between wage
and ability.
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from the other immigrants. Facing a low average wage in the destination country,
together with direct and indirect migration costs, such as transportation cost, forgone
income, etc, they will not migrate at this situation. Only individuals that have low
productive ability can benefit from migration without signaling. In this situation, the
lower tail selection happens. And lastly, while there exists a signal with zero cost,
the ability distribution of immigrants in the destination country should be the same
as that of the country of origin. In other words, immigrants should be a mixture of
high, medium and low ability people. And the wage levels in the destination country
should correspond to their respective ability levels.
Caponi (2011) provides evidence on the selection of Mexican immigrants to the
U.S. Using a structurally estimated intergenerational self-selection model of migration
and education, Caponi concludes that Mexican immigrants to the U.S. are positively
self-selected with respect to their ability levels.
4.3 The Model
For the purposes of this paper, the theoretical model and identification strategy for
wage analysis follows the work of Gibbons and Katz (1991). The variance analysis
follows the work of Kahn (2009). This paper, however, extends their theoretical
predictions to the empirical identification of immigrants’ signaling decisions and their
labour market results. This paper also proposes new implications for the existence of
asymmetric information among immigrants, and tests these implications through the
analysis of employment duration and permanent wage difference.
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4.3.1 Model Setup
Facing a suppressed wage after arriving in the destination country, the high ability
immigrants, if they exist, will decide whether or not to distinguish themselves from
the others and be rewarded with a higher return in the destination country labour
market.
When a signal takes time, employers in the destination country will not be able to
detect the ability difference among immigrants before the signal is effective. Based on
the known ability distribution among immigrants, employers are only willing to pay
a wage corresponding to the mean of the known immigrant ability distribution. Thus
the wage difference between high and low ability immigrants is not observable at this
stage. However, after an immigrant’s ability has been revealed by an effective signal,
this immigrant will be paid a wage that corresponds to his or her actual ability level,
whereas immigrants that choose not signaling their ability level will still receive an
average wage. Thus, there exists a wage difference between the signal and non-signal
immigrant groups at this point. The following equation is used to identify the signal
effect4.
lnwt = X
′β + Iα + εt (1)
where X are observable characteristics and I is the index for the signal group. The
estimate, αˆ, will capture the effect of the signal on wages for the group of immigrants
with revealed ability, compared to the group of immigrants that do not signal their
ability levels. It will be positive and significant when an effective signal successfully
reveal the high ability group. However, it will be insignificant before such signals
become effective, or if there is no ability difference among immigrants.
Corresponding to the wage changes before and after an effective signal, the vari-
4For details of the methodology and identification strategy, please see Gibbons and Katz (1991).
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ance of immigrant income, which corresponds to immigrants’ ability levels, should
also be different. The wage distribution and its variance are suppressed when immi-
grants are paid an average wage, based on the known immigrant ability distribution.
However, while there is an effective signal that is able to reveal the group’s actual
ability level, the wage paid to these immigrants will represent their ability difference
and follow its distribution. Thus, immigrants that choose to signal their actual abil-
ity levels would experience a larger change of income variance following their wage
change, compared with the suppressed case of the non-signal group. Identifying the
change of wage variance takes a two-step procedure5.
lnwt − lnwt−1 = X
′β1 + Iα1 + ξt (2)
ξ2t = X
′β2 + Iα2 + et (3)
The first stage involves regressing the difference of the natural log wages right
before and after an effective signal on observable characteristics and the group index,
I. In the second stage, the square of the ξt, which is the residual obtained from the
first stage regression, will be used as the dependent variable, and it is regressed on
the same independent variables. If the signal is able to reveal the signaling behavior
of immigrants that have high ability, the estimate αˆ2 will be positive and significant.
When there are different ability levels among immigrants, there will be a per-
manent difference between high and low ability immigrants. Performance in the
destination country’s labour market will depend on an immigrant’s ability to adapt
to this new environment. Immigrants that have high ability will be more efficient at
acquiring and utilizing labour market information than immigrants with low ability.
This ensures that immigrants with high ability are able to acquire relevant employ-
5For detail of this methodology and identification strategy, please check Kahn (2009).
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ment much more easier than those immigrants with low ability. Furthermore, the
high ability immigrants are more likely to keep employed status longer than the rest
immigrants. Therefore, immigrants with high ability have a longer employment du-
ration and, together with the effective signals, a higher permanent wage than those
immigrants whose ability locate at low levels. These two hypotheses are tested by
equation (4) :
y = X ′β + Iα + η (4)
where y is the duration of employment in the period of first four years after landing
for the employment duration analysis, and y equals the average wage in the survey




The data that is utilized in this paper are extracted from the Longitudinal Survey
of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC), which is administered jointly by Citizenship and
Immigration Canada (CIC) and Statistics Canada. LSIC is designed to provide infor-
mation pertaining to how newly arrived immigrants establish their economic, social,
and cultural ties to Canadian society during their first years in Canada. The survey
therefore excludes the individuals that applied and landed from within Canada. It




The survey sample was chosen randomly among immigrants that arrived in Canada
between October 1, 2000 and September 30, 2001, 15 years of age or older at the time
of landing, and landed from outside of Canada. Those immigrants that were chosen
for the survey were interviewed within a six-month period from the date of landing
to interview. Interviews were conducted three times within a four-year period after
their arrival. Data collection for the first wave began in April 2001 and ended in
May 2002. Approximately 12,000 newly landed immigrants were interviewed. It rep-
resents approximately 164,200 of the 250,000 individuals admitted to Canada during
the period. The survey population cover all Census Metropolitan Areas (CMA) and
non-remote Census Agglomerations (CA). The second and third wave of interview
were held at the end of the second and fourth year after the date of landing. The
second survey included around 9,300 immigrants, while in the third survey the sample
dropped to 7,700.
Compared to other commonly used data sources for immigration studies, such
as the Canadian Census of Population and other large-scale cross-sectional surveys,
LSIC has a comparative advantage. Besides detailed information on age, sex, mother
tongue, country of origin, visa type, knowledge of English/French etc., LSIC provides
information on the immigrant’s formal education, both foreign and Canadian.
LSIC also contains detailed information on the employment history of the immi-
grant after landing as well as information on pre-migration occupation. Occupational
information includes both industry unit groups, based on North American Industry
Classification (NAICS 1997), and occupation unit groups, based on Standard Oc-
cupation Classification System (SOC 1991). Lastly and perhaps most importantly,
the longitudinal characteristics of LSIC make it possible to identify the existence of
asymmetric information and signals.
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4.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
This research extracts a sub-sample from the LSIC, which includes both male and
female immigrants between the ages of 18 and 55 at the time of the first interview. The
age restriction is imposed in order to avoid compulsory schooling for young adults and
the consideration involving retirement decisions. The analysis concentrates only on
immigrants from developing countries. Immigrants from developing countries make up
the majority of the immigrant population in Canada. They also face more obstacles to
assimilate into Canadian society. Our sample only includes immigrants that worked
before migration and participated in all three survey interviews. This generates a
balanced panel. In total, there are 4896 individuals observed in the four-year survey
period.7
As Table 4.1 indicates, about 46 percent8 of immigrants participated at least
once in some form of training9, including formal education. Trained immigrants
are on average younger than those that did not receive any training. The average
accumulated pre-migration formal education for trainees is marginally higher than
that of non-trainees, 15.7 years versus 14.8 years.
Table 4.1 also shows that there is a distinction in terms of occupation between
those that received training and those that did not. The proportion of trainees
that were employed in white-collar occupations in the country of origin is 73 per-
cent. The corresponding proportion for non-trained immigrants is 65 percent. This
suggests that, together with average pre-migration education, there is a positive re-
lationship between the acquisition of human capital before and after migration. Fur-
thermore, there is no notable wage difference between immigrants who invested in
7LSIC survey weights have been used in all empirical analysis in this paper.
8Calculated based on the total number of immigrants, 4896, divided by the number of immigrants
that ever participated in training after landing, 2242.
9Training includes all individuals that acquire a degree, diploma or certificate at completion, and
it adopts a broad concept that includes formal education, training due to career development, and
foreign credential recognition.
84





























Number of Obs 4896 2242 2654 262 4634 417 1218 1906 2084


































































































Male (%) 53.80 54.91 73.25 75.56 52.54 51.93 53.75 61.13 49.64
Source country
white-coll occ (%)
68.94 73.25 65.05 72.51 68.70 68.60 73.71 77.87 70.59
Married (%) 79.04 72.38 84.85 75.47 79.25 47.60 77.75 78.85 85.41
Skilled worker (%) 68.87 75.74 62.87 79.51 68.25 63.26 80.54 83.67 71.30
Visible minority
(%)
85.70 84.07 87.13 78.25 86.14 87.08 83.13 82.70 86.18
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post-migration human capital and those who did not. The average wage of the first
main job10 in Canada for those that received training is $12.9 per hour 11, which
is almost the same as that of immigrants who did not participate in any training
($13.5).
Immigrants with and without a pre-arranged job before migration are similar in
terms of age and pre-migration education. The proportion of immigrants that worked
in white-collar occupations in the country of origin are also similar. However, the av-
erage wage of the first main job after landing is very different: $24 per hour for
immigrants with a pre-arranged job and only $12 per hour for immigrants without a
pre-arranged job. There is a similar pattern between immigrants that have their for-
eign credentials recognized, either by Canadian employers, government, or Canadian
institutions, and those without recognized foreign credentials.
Another interesting point in the descriptive statistics to notice is, among immi-
grants with an arranged job before migration, 78 percent are visible minorities. The
percentage of minority immigrants increases to 86 percent for those without an ar-
ranged job. The corresponding percentage of visible minority immigrants with their
foreign credentials recognized (not recognized) is 83 percent (86 percent).
Table 4.2 shows the level of Canadian formal education after landing, by immigrant
class. Compared to non-skilled worker immigrants, there are more percentage of
skilled worker immigrants that pursue Canadian education at a level of Master or PhD
degree, and less percentage at high school or lower education levels. There are very
close percentage of skilled and non-skilled worker immigrants that pursue education at
Bachelor or college level. However, skilled worker immigrants on average have longer
years of pre-migration education (16.2) than the non-skilled worker immigrants (13.1).
And about 75 percent of individuals that repeat their Canadian education at the
10Immigrants reports any job they held in the period of interview. However, they have to identify
only one as the the main job for the period.
11Hourly wage is calculated based on reported weekly wage divided by weekly working hours.
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Master/PhD 15.72 19.45 3.72
Bachelor 24.20 23.94 24.95
College/Diploma 53.43 53.72 52.52
High school and lower 6.64 2.87 18.81
same level as the education level at their country of origin, or even pursue Canadian
education at a lower level, are skilled worker immigrants12.
The above descriptive statistics reveals the first evidence that, other than tradi-
tional human capital characteristics, unobserved characteristics may have an impor-
tant role in determining immigrant labour market performance. This will be explored
from econometric modeling in the following section.
4.5 Empirical Results
Before testing the existence of effective signals, we must first determine what could
work as a signal to reveal an immigrant’s actual ability level. As signalling model
points out, the mechanism to work as a signal must satisfy two conditions: first, while
immigrants with high ability can be rewarded by their signaling decision, immigrants
that have low ability cannot, due to high direct or indirect costs; and second, the
signal must be clear and effective to the labour market. This implies that no one is
able to pretend to be in the other group when the signal cost is low.
12Please see Table 4.1
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Evidence from previous research reveals that more educated immigrants are apt
to invest in human capital, i.e., training or formal education, in the destination coun-
try, and furthermore, they also benefit from a high return to this investment in the
local labour market (Friedberg, 2000; Chiswick, 1999). This may result from the fact
that, via a long hiring history, local employers may be able to observe and reward the
ability of domestic graduates through the known education system. Could this post-
migration human capital investment work as a signal for newly arrived immigrants
to Canada?
4.5.1 Canadian Training and Formal Education as Signal
As Table 4.1 shows, 46 percent of immigrants choose to participate in training or
formal education after landing. Thus if training, including formal education, in the
destination country can work as a signal, the hypothesis αˆ = 0 in equation (3) must
not be rejected before training starts. Furthermore, it should be rejected after training
is effectively revealing an immigrant’s actual ability. If both are true, this implies that
an ability difference exists between those that invest in acquiring human capital in the
destination country and those that do not, after controlling for traditional observable
human capital variables, such as foreign and domestic education, work experience,
occupation, etc.
With a natural log transmission of hourly wage as the dependent variable, the
estimates for testing this hypothesis are shown in first two columns of Table 4.3.
The first column shows the estimates for immigrants that had a job before training,
compared with immigrants that have not participated in training at all in the four-year
survey period. As we can see, while trainees receive a wage lower than the non-trainees
before training starts (5.5%), the difference is not significant after training (Please
see Table 4.3, column 2).
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Number of Obs 2276 2938 1673
R
2 0.3887 0.3389 0.3755
a, Significant at 1% level; b, Significant at 5% level; c, Significant at 10% level.
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Though most of the trainees in LSIC have participated in training more than
once, the duration of their first training is negatively related to wage. Considering
that immigrants included in the survey are those that landed from outside of Canada
within the first six month period after landing, the first time training they experienced
is most likely to represent the acquisition of Canadian labour market information,
but it is not directly connected to human capital increment. The most efficient
learners, or those that have relatives and/or friends in Canada, will leave the state of
unemployment faster and obtain relatively higher paid employment.
Self-reported language fluency at the time of landing also contributes to the wage
difference. Immigrants that reported that their English or French is good, or fairly
good, earn eight percent more, compared to immigrant that consider their knowledge
of both official languages as being poor at the time of the first interview. By using
high school as a reference group of educational attainment, immigrants with higher
foreign education levels are rewarded with higher wages from the Canadian labour
market. However, while using years of education, the return to foreign education
is quite low (roughly 2% each year)13, which is consistent with previous research
(Friedberg, 2000).
The estimates for the after-training regression is shown in column two of Table
4.3. The third-wave wage is used to represent income after the signal. Since the
interview for the third wave was conducted four years after landing, there should be
enough time for a signal, if it exists, to be effective to reveal an immigrant’s actual
ability level. As we can see, these estimates demonstrate the same pattern as the ones
before training starts14. However, the estimate for the group index, which represents
the wage difference between trainees and non-trainees, is insignificant. Considering
this estimate is negative and significant before training starts, we are able to conclude
that a general definition of training is not able to work as an effective signal to reveal
13Please check Appendix A1, column 1 for the regression results.
14Estimates for acquired Canadian formal education locate at Appendix, column 1 of Table A2.
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an immigrant’s actual ability level.
Though a general definition of training cannot work as an effective signal for immi-
grants, it still reveals some interesting information. The group index, trainee dummy,
is estimated with skilled worker immigrants and non-skilled worker immigrants, re-
spectively. The results reveal that the negative effect comes from immigrants that
were admitted under the skilled worker immigrants. The estimate of the trainee
dummy for the skilled worker immigrants is negative, comparatively large in absolute
value, and significant before training starts (shown in Table 4.3, column 3). Con-
versely, it is small for the non-skilled worker immigrants and insignificant at the same
period15.
The negative sign for skilled worker immigrants, before training starts, may mainly
be due to their formal education before landing. The majority of skilled worker im-
migrants are selected based on their potential human capital, due to the Canadian
immigration policies that are in place, which focus on the education level of an in-
dividual at the post-secondary level. It would be interesting to take a look at the
level of formal education in which the skilled worker immigrants participated after
landing.
When the return to an additional year of education is positive, it is worth to
notice that 25 percent16 of immigrants undertook formal education in Canada at a
level higher than their education level at the country of origin. However, 75 percent
of them repeated their education at the same level in Canada, or obtained education
credentials in Canada that are lower than what was acquired in their country of
origin17. Does this reveal the ability difference among these immigrants?
15Please see Appendix, Table A1, column 2 for the regression results.
16Calculated based on the total number of immigrants that invested in Canadian formal education
after migration, divided by the number of immigrants that went to a level of Canadian education
higher than their education level in the country of origin.
17The comparison of the original and source country education level is based on ED1Q001 and
ED3Q297 in LSIC.
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Canadian edu before landing 0.221a
(0.063)
Duration of first training -0.035a
(0.014)
Number of Obs 736 1183
R
2 0.3232 0.3435
a, Significant at 1% level; b, Significant at 5% level; c, Significant at 10% level.
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To answer this question, the signal is defined as a dummy variable that equals
to one if an immigrant’s level of Canadian formal education is higher than his pre-
migration education level. Conversely, the outcome is equal to zero if an immigrant
repeated his or her educational level or even studied a lower one in Canada, compared
to the education that they have acquired in their country of origin. The regression
results are shown in Table 4.4. The estimate for the group index reveals that there is
no wage difference between these two groups before their Canadian education starts.
However, there is a significant wage difference at the end of the survey, four years after
landing, the time in which they have most probably graduated18. This is consistent
with the prediction of equation (1). After controlling for observable characteristics,
the signal group earn eight percent more than the non-signal immigrants. We there-
fore are able to conclude that the relative formal education level in which immigrants
have participated in after landing is able to work as an effective signal to reveal an
immigrant’s actual ability level. High ability immigrants, by going to a higher educa-
tion level in Canada, compared to the education level in the country of origin, signal
their actual ability levels to Canadian employers. They therefore are rewarded with
a wage higher than the immigrants that repeat their education level, or studying at
a lower one.
4.5.2 Foreign Credential Recognition and Arranged Job as
signal
While the level of Canadian formal education is able to work as a signal to reveal an
immigrant’s actual ability level, it is not one of the best signals. Formal education, no
matter whether an individual participate at a higher level or not, is not only a financial
burden to immigrants themselves, but also leads to an over-education problem for
18Estimates for Canadian formal education locate at Appendix, Table A2, column 2.
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the destination country. Over-education also delays immigrants’ contribution to the
economic development of the destination country. Looking for other signals would
yield economic benefits and be of policy interest.
Foreign Credential Recognition
With unknown developing-country education systems, credentials obtained from de-
veloping countries are not generally accepted in the developed destination countries.
This results in a low labour market return to these credentials at the destination coun-
try. Following the changing structure of the immigrant composition, more educated
immigrants (i.e., skilled workers) from developing countries have entered Canada since
the 1970s. The attitudes of Canadian employers towards foreign credentials have
changed gradually, due to an increasing hiring experience. The descriptive statistics
show that around 50% of developing country immigrants have their foreign creden-
tials recognized by either the labour market, educational institutions or the Canadian
government. Descriptive statistics also show that there are no natural differences be-
tween immigrants with recognized foreign credentials and those without, concerning
the mean of age, years of foreign education, and the type occupation in the coun-
try of origin. Could this foreign credential recognition work as a signal to reveal an
immigrant’s actual ability level?
To test whether recognized foreign credentials is able to work as an effective signal,
the same method that distinguishes the signal effect of Canadian formal education
in the previous section has been adopted here. The regression results are shown in
Table 4.5, column 1 and 2. The estimates are similar to those with level of Canadian
formal education as signal.
The group index, representing immigrants with recognized foreign credentials rela-
tive to those without, is positive before recognition; however, it is statistically insignif-
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Number of Obs 2030 2923
R
2 0.3650 0.3036
a, Significant at 1% level; b, Significant at 5% level; c, Significant at 10% level.
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icant. The null hypothesis that there is no wage difference between the signal and
non-signal group before their foreign credential recognized, therefore, is not rejected.
Further, the group index that represents the wage difference after credential recogni-
tion reveals that the signal group earns seven percent more, which is both statistically
and economically significant, than the non-signal group. This result corroborates the
signal effect of the foreign credential recognition. It also reveals that foreign creden-
tial recognition is an important and effective method to help immigrants that migrate
from developing countries and the success of their economic assimilation.
Arranged Job Before Migration
While the level of Canadian formal education and the recognition of foreign cre-
dentials are effective signals to reveal an immigrant’s actual ability level, would the
same apply to these immigrants whose productive ability is directly observable to
Canadian employers?
With a worldwide economy, international economic cooperation is common. The
branches of international firms in developing countries provide an opportunity for
employers in the destination country to observe their ability. While considering the
requirements in the destination country’s labour market, the wage the firm provides
to immigrants with an arranged job would be an equilibrium wage. This implies that
the benefit to immigrants, represented by this wage, is at least equal to the migration
and opportunity cost. At the same time, the firm has maximized its profit. Thus,
the firm will select the most able people in the developing-country population at the
offered wage level. The wages for immigrants with arranged jobs before migration
therefore correspond to the wages after a signal takes effect. Therefore, immigrants
with pre-arranged jobs should have comparatively higher wages than all other immi-
grants’ at the first wave (within six months after landing), when it is too early for
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Number of Obs 2393 3474
R
2 0.3731 0.3252
a, Significant at 1% level; b, Significant at 5% level; c, Significant at 10% level.
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other signals to have effect.
The regression results for immigrants with arranged job are shown in column 1
and column 2 of Table 4.6. Column 1 shows the estimates for immigrants’ first main
job in Canada, and the estimates corresponding to their hourly wage in the third
wave of the survey are in column 2.
In order to control for immigrant occupational differences, two dummy variables
are included to represent occupational categories. One represents immigrants’ oc-
cupations in the country of origin, and the other in the Canadian labour market.
These occupational dummies are equal to one if an immigrant works in an university-
educated professional occupation, i.e., a white-collar occupation. The outcome is
equal to zero if an immigrant is working in a routine or semi-routine job, i.e., a blue-
collar occupation. This is in line with previous research that examines occupation
and wage changes (Cohen and Eckstein, 2008).
Holding other observable characteristics constant, immigrants with an arranged
job before migration earn 24 percent more than the rest immigrants in the period
within the first six month period after landing; they earn 18 percent more at the
end of the survey, four years later, when other signals, such as the level of formal
education and the recognition of foreign credentials, start showing effects.
4.5.3 Employment Duration and Income Variance Analysis
To test the signal effect of employment duration and the change of income variance,
the upper three signal groups are integrated into one larger group. This compares
immigrants with high ability, that choose to signal their ability levels and at least
have a job after the signal becomes effective, with the rest immigrants that do not
have any effective signal in the four year survey period. This identification strategy,
and the associated regression results are discussed in the following two paragraphs.
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Number of Obs 3820 2165
R
2 0.1253 0.0221
a, Significant at 1% level; b, Significant at 5% level; c, Significant at 10% level.
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For the analysis of income variance, a two-stage regression is undertaken as ex-
plained in the model setup, equation (2) and (3). The estimates of the second stage
regression are shown in Table 4.7, column 2. Corresponding to the other immigrants,
the estimate for the group index shows that the immigrants that choose to signal
their ability levels have experienced a larger change of their wage variance, compared
to immigrants without any effective signals. This is consistent with the prediction of
the model.
While receiving wages higher than the others, high ability immigrants are less
likely to become unemployed. Besides their high productive ability, these immigrants
may acquire local labour market information easily and utilize it more efficiently. This
gives them better opportunities to become employed. This simultaneously implies
that these immigrants have longer employment duration since landing. Equation
(4) is used to test this prediction and the regression results are shown in Table 4.7,
column 1. For immigrants that choose one of the three effective signals, the duration
of their employed periods in the first four years after landing is ten percent longer than
immigrants that do not choose to signal their ability levels. This result is significant
at the 5% level. The result corroborates the prediction of the model.
4.5.4 Permanent Wage Difference
Following the corroborative evidence of the existence of effective signals and immi-
grants with different productive ability levels, a permanent wage difference between
high ability immigrants and the rest has been predicted. Is this true for the immi-
grants in LSIC? Using average wage in the four years of survey periods as dependent
variable, a regression is estimated using the same independent variables as in previous
analysis. The group index variable equals to one if an immigrant chooses to signal
his ability level and he or she at least has a job after the signal comes into effect. The
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Number of Obs 3820 3820 3820 3820
R
2 0.3666 0.3759 0.3664 0.3773
a, Significant at 1% level; b, Significant at 5% level; c, Significant at 10% level.
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estimates of the regression are shown in Table 4.8.
For immigrants that participated in a level of formal Canadian education higher
than their pre-migration education level, their average income is nine percent higher
than the remaining immigrants, including other signal groups, within the first four
years period after landing. For immigrants with an arranged job before migration,
their average wage is 21 percent higher than that of other immigrants. Immigrants
with recognized foreign credentials on average earn four percent more than immigrants
that their foreign credentials have not been recognized. When all the three signal
groups are integrated into one group, their average hourly wage is 7.5 percent higher
than the non-signal group, in the first four years landed in Canada.
Though significant or insignificant at five percent level, the negative return to
Canadian education looks unreasonable. However, descriptive statistics shows about
54 percent of immigrants participate in college and/or diploma level education. Fur-
thermore, another 24 percent seek a bachelor level education; some drop out prior
to completing their degree. Most individuals that pursue bachelor or lower level of
education are skilled worker immigrants. Considering the requirements of Canadian
immigration policies, it is almost impossible for a person to be a skilled worker im-
migrant to Canada when his or her education level is lower than college education.19
The comparison of pre- and post-education level confirms that a large percentage
of immigrants that migrate from a developing country repeat their Canadian educa-
tion at the same level as their country of origin, or pursue a level of education lower
than their country of origin after landing. This drags down the return to Canadian
education and contributes to the negative sign 20.
19Canadian immigration policy allows people with education lower than college to apply for migra-
tion, but it requires that the immigrant works in a designated occupation area and receives full score
on age, work experience, language, and adaptive ability section in order to reach 67, the official pass-
ing score. Under the prescribed rules, it is nearly impossible for a low educated developing-country
person to immigrate as skilled worker to Canada.
20Caponi, 2011, also reports a negative return to education for Mexican American.
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4.6 Summary and Conclusions
Contrary to the prediction of standard human capital theory that only a single group
of people migrate, either the upper or the lower tail of ability distribution in the
source country population, this paper shows that Canadian immigrants who landed
in the early 2000s are drawn from the entire spectrum of the ability distribution. By
developing intuitively plausible and testable predictions under the assumption of exis-
tence asymmetric information, this paper has provided a quantitative evidence-based
model that is consistent with the predictions of the asymmetric information model
on immigrant selection. It has also provided further analysis of immigrant quality
resulting from Canadian immigration policies.
The empirical results indicate that, no matter what the initiatives of Canadian
immigration policy are, immigrants that landed in the year 2000 are mixed with both
high and low abilities. These two groups of immigrants assimilate differently into the
Canadian economy in the first four years after landing. This result is consistent with
the first and the second essay that find that heterogeneity exists in the immigrant
population, and this heterogeneity affects the increment of immigrants’ wages and
therefore their assimilation process.
By discussing three plausible signals and their predictions in the Canadian labour
market, this paper has also provided various implications for future immigrant selec-
tion and assimilation policies. For example, while foreign credential recognition helps
to increase immigrant wages and to decrease unemployment duration, immigrants
with an arranged job belong to the most able class, and are the most adaptable to
the requirement of the Canadian labour market. Compared to other immigrants,
immigrants with an arranged job earn a higher income and fill instantaneously the
demand of the Canadian labour market. As one of the sufficient conditions that are
required to apply for migration to Canada21, a pre-arranged job before landing brings
21To be eligible to apply for migration to Canada, the applicant has to have either an arranged
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the most needed, and the most able immigrants, to the Canadian economy. As for
the signal of participating in formal education in Canada that exceeds the level from
their original country, it is able to work as a signal to reveal an immigrant’s high
ability. However it engages more personal and social resources. Furthermore, it also
delays immigrants’ contribution to the economic development of Canada.
Through the analysis of three possible signals and their screening effect on immi-
grants’ ability, this paper suggests some further potential research topics. Although
this paper has discussed ability differences among developing country immigrants, it
is worth comparing the high and/or low ability immigrants with the Canadian born
to find the difference in their the long-run assimilation. Looking for other poten-
tial effective signals also attracts policy and economic interest, under the automatic
labour market screen mechanism.
job or one year work experience in designated occupations.
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Limitation and Possible Extension
This dissertation analyzes the early integration process of recently landed immigrants
to Canada. In order to examine this process, data is utilized from the LSIC by look-
ing at immigrants that landed in Canada between October 1, 2000 and September
30, 2001. Empirical results from this research provide further evidence on immi-
grant post-migration human capital investment, labour market integration, and the
selection effect of Canadian immigration policy in the corresponding survey period.
The LSIC is designed to provide information on how newly arrived immigrants
integrate into Canadian society, both economically and socially. The LSIC contains
detailed information pertaining to an immigrant’s educational attainment, foreign
credentials recognition, employment status, labour market income, social networks,
and accommodation, etc, in Canada. These indicators cover the first four years
immigrants first landed in Canada. This design, however, limits this research on
immigrants to a short time span: the first four years after landing. Furthermore,
because the LSIC only includes immigrants, it is impossible to make a comparison
between immigrants and Canadian born.
The integration of immigrants into the destination country is a long process. Pre-
vious research reveals that immigrant’s income, on average, increases faster than the
native born. However, it takes decades to close the initial wage gap between immi-
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grants and the native born, and for immigrants to obtain the same income level as
their Canadian counterparts. As a result of this, it is prudent to explore whether the
initial wage gap experienced by immigrants in influenced by the acquisition of human
capital and the requirements of Canadian labour market. Moreover, it is important to
determine the effect of a skill mismatch on the immigrant initial wages. Furthermore,
how this affects immigrants’ long-run assimilation. Therefore, this research will be
extended in the following four possible dimensions:
1. Extending current analysis to a long time frame, analyzing the influence of the
early stage post-migration human capital investment on immigrant catch up
effects, and investigating the dynamics of immigrant occupational choices.
2. Comparing immigrants with Canadian born, analyzing their income and occu-
pation differences in both a short and a long time frame.
3. Investigating the results of the selection process implemented through Canadian
immigration policy on immigrants that migrated from developed countries and,
identifying the determinants and making a comparison to immigrants that were
originally from developing countries.
4. Exploring the mismatch of immigrants’ acquired human capital with the job



















































































Number of Obs 2276 603
R
2 0.3919 0.2611
a, Significant at 1% level; b, Significant at 5% level; c, Significant at 10% level.
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Duration of first training -0.032b
(0.016)
a, Significant at 1% level; b, Significant at 5% level; c, Significant at 10% level.
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